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I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, the decision to treat a 
patient was up to a hospital’s discretion.1  The primary function of 
hospitals was originally rooted in servicing the poor; however, the 
primary function of hospitals changed during the twentieth century due 
to a number of developments in the American health care system.2  
Hospitals now serve as the “epicenters of medical care” for everyone.3  
The increased demand for hospital services throughout the twentieth 
century led to increased costs for providing health care, and hospitals 
were forced to shift their focus to patients who could pay their hospital 
bills as a means for subsidizing the increased costs of care for the poor.4  
This necessary shift in focus, in conjunction with changes in the way 
society paid for health care, particularly Medicare’s adoption of a 
prospective payment system (PPS) in 1983, led to a phenomenon called 
“patient dumping” during the 1980s.5  Patient dumping is when a 
hospital refuses to treat a person in need of emergency medical 
treatment because of the person’s uninsured status or inability to pay.6 
Congress responded to patient dumping by passing the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) in 1986.7  EMTALA 
 
1.  Alexa E. Welzien, Balancing EMTALA’s Duty to Stabilize Hospital Inpatients and 
CMS’s Regulations in the Midst of A Struggling Hospital Industry, HEALTH LAW., Aug. 2011, 
21, at 21 (2) (“[H]ospitals had no affirmative duty to treat patients and could simply choose 
which patients to serve and which to refuse without any given reason.”).  Private hospitals and 
many public hospitals certainly had discretion in choosing whom to treat; although it should 
be noted that public hospitals accepting funds for new hospital construction under the Hill-
Burton Act of 1946 were required to provide assurances that they would provide “a 
reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay” in the new or updated facility.  42 
U.S.C. § 291c(e) (2012).  Hospitals accepting funding under the Hill-Burton Act did not have 
an affirmative duty to treat all indigent persons though; rather, they were only required to 
promise to treat “a reasonable volume” of indigent persons.  Id.  Additionally, the Act 
provided an exception from this required promise if it was “not feasible from a financial 
viewpoint” for the hospital.  Id.  Therefore, even public hospitals that received funding under 
the Hill-Burton Act retained some discretion in accepting patients.  For a more detailed 
discussion of the common law no-duty rule and Hill-Burton Act, see Karen I. Treiger, Note, 
Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA’s Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 1191–
92, 1196–201 (1986). 
2.  Welzien, supra note 1, at 21–22; see also Treiger, supra note 1, at 1191–96. 
3.  Welzien, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
4.  See id. at 22; see also Treiger, supra note 1, at 1192–96. 
5.  Welzien, supra note 1, at 22. 
6.  See infra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
7.  Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 
§ 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 164–67 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012)). 
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requires hospital emergency departments (EDs) to screen and provide 
necessary stabilization to anyone who requests an exam, regardless of 
his or her ability to pay.8  By requiring EDs to provide emergency 
medical care to everyone, the Act created a national health care safety 
net; however, the Act does not include a mechanism for funding this 
required care, which has resulted in several unintended consequences.9 
The legislative history is clear that members of Congress intended 
EMTALA to prohibit patient dumping,10 but the language of the statute 
has resulted in a broader application of the statute than it seems the 
Legislature intended.11  The inconsistency between the legislative 
history of the Act and the plain meaning of its text divided the courts in 
the years after EMTALA’s enactment.12  In an attempt to balance the 
Act’s legislative history and the plain meaning of its text, the Sixth 
Circuit adopted an “improper motive requirement” for claims involving 
a violation of EMTALA’s medical screening requirement.13  Thus far, 
the Sixth Circuit stands alone amongst the federal appellate courts in 
adopting this improper motive requirement. 
The combination of EMTALA’s application to everyone, its lack of 
funding, and the shift in health care reimbursement to a PPS has placed 
an ever-increasing financial burden on hospitals.14  This burden takes an 
even greater toll on hospitals with safety net EDs, because safety net 
EDs provide services to a disproportionate number of uninsured and 
underinsured individuals.15  America’s health care safety net is 
unraveling—hospitals and EDs close each year as a result of Medicare 
 
8.  42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(a)–(b) (2012). 
9.  See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
10.  See infra Part III.A. 
11.  See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 270 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(“[The plain meaning of EMTALA’s text] leads to a result considerably broader than one 
might think Congress should have intended, or perhaps than any or all individual members of 
Congress were cognizant of.”); see also Victoria K. Perez, Comment, EMTALA: Protecting 
Patients First by Not Deferring to the Final Regulations, 4 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 149, 
174 (2007); Scott B. Smith, Note, The Critical Condition of the Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act: A Proposed Amendment to the Act After In the Matter of Baby K, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1515 (1995); Thomas L. Stricker, Jr., Note, The Emergency Medical 
Treatment & Active Labor Act: Denial of Emergency Medical Care Because of Improper 
Economic Motives, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1122 (1992). 
12.  See infra Part IV.A. 
13.  See infra Part IV.B. 
14.  See infra Part II.A. 
15.  See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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and Medicaid payment shortfalls and the uncompensated care costs 
created by EMTALA.16 
In addition to the financial burden EMTALA places on hospitals, 
the Act also contributes to the problem of ED overcrowding.17  ED 
overcrowding adversely affects the quality of care hospitals provide to 
all their patients, insured and uninsured alike.18 
Other commentators have remarked upon the financial problems 
facing hospitals19 and the Sixth Circuit’s improper motive requirement.20  
Some commentators have even proposed amending EMTALA to make 
the statute’s language consistent with its legislative history.21  This 
Comment distinguishes itself by (1) examining the problems facing 
hospitals and EDs in a new manner; (2) proposing amendments to 
address the problems facing hospitals with EDs, the current circuit split, 
and the discrepancy between EMTALA’s legislative history and the 
plain meaning of its text; and (3) discussing the unique ramifications of 
these amendments. 
This Comment proposes amendments to EMTALA that limit the 
Act’s coverage to indigent or uninsured persons and clarifies its 
intended purpose—stopping patient dumping.  Adoption of these 
amendments to EMTALA will accord the Act’s text with its legislative 
history, resolve the current circuit split, and partially remedy 
EMTALA’s unintended consequences.  Alternatively, this Comment 
 
16.  See infra Part II. 
17.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
18.  See INST. OF MED., HOSPITAL-BASED EMERGENCY CARE: AT THE BREAKING 
POINT, at xv (2007). 
19.  See generally Svetlana Lebedinski, EMTALA: Treatment of Undocumented Aliens 
and the Financial Burden It Places on Hospitals, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 146 (2005) (examining the 
financial burden placed on EDs by EMTALA for the treatment of undocumented aliens); 
Samuel R. Maizel & Craig Garner, The Poor Get Poorer: The Fate of Distressed Hospitals 
Under the Affordable Care Act, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Dec. 2012, at 1 (2012) 
(examining the effects of the ACA on financially distressed hospitals); Erik J. Olson, Note, 
No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room, 46 STAN. L. REV. 449 
(1994) (examining the quality of care and fiscal issues facing EDs and proposing a system of 
primary care centers). 
20.  See generally Wendy W. Bera, Comment, Preventing “Patient-Dumping”: The 
Supreme Court Turns Away the Sixth Circuit’s Interpretation of EMTALA, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 
615, 629–35 (1999) (detailing the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the Sixth Circuit’s 
improper motive requirement); Stricker, supra note 11, at 1149–56 (proposing amendments to 
EMTALA limiting its application to instances where an “improper economic motive is 
present.”). 
21.  See Smith, supra note 11, at 1534–37 (proposing amendments to EMTALA limiting 
the Act’s application to uninsured and indigent persons). 
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argues that adoption of the Sixth Circuit’s improper motive requirement 
for claims alleging a violation of EMTALA’s medical screening 
requirement will result in case decisions more in line with the original 
intent of the Legislature and reduce the number of improper EMTALA 
claims.  This in turn will reduce some of the fiscal pressure being placed 
on EDs today. 
Part II of this Comment outlines some of the problems facing EDs 
that EMTALA exacerbates.  Part III examines EMTALA in greater 
detail, including its legislative history and statutory language.  Part IV 
discusses the judiciary’s application of the statute, including the division 
between the courts, the Sixth Circuit’s improper motive requirement, 
and the only Supreme Court decision to date interpreting EMTALA.  
Part V offers three suggestions that could remedy the inconsistency 
between EMTALA’s legislative history and its text, resolve the circuit 
split, and reduce some of the problems confronting EDs. 
II. PROBLEMS AFFECTING EDS EXACERBATED BY EMTALA 
Since EMTALA’s enactment the number of visits to hospital EDs 
has steadily increased.22  For example, in 1991 there were 88.5 million 
ED visits, and by 2011 the number of ED visits had increased to 129.5 
million.23  According to a 2007 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, 
“[b]etween 1993 and 2003, the population of the United States grew by 
12 percent . . . and ED visits rose by more than 2 million per year from 
90.3 to 113.9 million—a 26 percent increase.”24  These figures are quite 
clear that population growth alone does not account for the increased 
use of EDs.25 
While EDs experienced a growing number of visits, the number of 
uninsured persons in the United States grew from 35.4 million (14.1% of 
the population) in 1991 to 48.6 million (15.7% of the population) in 
 
22.  See AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N, TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK 2013: TRENDS AFFECTING 
HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS, at A-28 (2013) [hereinafter TRENDWATCH 
CHARTBOOK] (reporting the number of emergency department visits annually from 1991 
through 2011, including but not limited to 88.5 million in 1991, 94.7 million in 1995, 103.1 
million in 2000, 114.8 million in 2005, and 129.5 million in 2011). 
23.  Id. (reporting that in 1991 there were 88.5 million ED visits or 351 visits per every 
1,000 people, and in 2011 there were 129.5 million ED visits or 415 visits per every 1,000 
people). 
24.  INST. OF MED., supra note 18, at 2. 
25.  See id.; see also LINA CHOUDHRY ET AL., THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH 
CENTERS & COMMUNITY-AFFILIATED HEALTH PLANS ON EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT 
USE 1 (2007). 
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2011.26  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the number 
of uninsured reached 55 million in 2013.27  Although uninsured persons 
are not the sole cause of the growth in ED visits, due to EMTALA they 
are definitely a contributing cause.28 
EMTALA’s enactment resulted in hospital EDs becoming the only 
point of access in America’s health care system that serves all patients 
regardless of their ability to pay, which lead to EDs becoming the 
nation’s main health care safety net.29  According to the IOM, 
“[C]ore safety net providers” [have] two distinguishing 
characteristics: 1) either by legal mandate or explicitly adopted 
mission they maintain an “open door,” offering access to services 
for patients regardless of their ability to pay; and 2) a substantial 
share of their patient mix is uninsured, Medicaid, and other 
vulnerable patients.30 
As a result of being the main health care safety net for a nation 
experiencing growth in both the number of ED visits and its uninsured 
population, EDs are under increasing financial pressures and suffering 
from overcrowding.31 
 
26.  TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at A-10. 
27.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE, MAY 2013 BASELINE, at tbl.1 (2013), available at https://www.cbo.g
ov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43900-2013-05-ACA.pdf, archived at https://perma.c
c/E7R5-PNKD.  This figure “includes unauthorized immigrants as well as people who are 
eligible for but not enrolled in Medicaid” and are under the age of 65.  Id.  The CBO 
estimated that the number of uninsured would only rise to 55 million in 2013, rather than the 
previously estimated 57 million under the old law, as a result of the Affordable Care Act and 
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.  Id. 
28.  See INST. OF MED., supra note 18, at 3. 
29.  E.g., id. at xv. (“[T]he emergency care system has become the ‘safety net of the 
safety net,’ providing primary care services to millions of Americans who are uninsured or 
otherwise lack access to other community services.”); Steven R. Eastaugh, Overcrowding and 
Fiscal Pressures in Emergency Medicine, HOSPITAL TOPICS, Winter 2002, at 7, 8 (“EDs have 
become the primary healthcare safety net in this country.”); W. Wesley Fields et al., The 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act as a Federal Health Care Safety Net Program, 8 
ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1064, 1064 (2001) (“EDs play a vital role as core safety net 
providers in today’s health care system.”); Renee Y. Hsia, Arthur L. Kellerman & Yu-Chu 
Shen, Factors Associated With Closures of Emergency Departments in the United States, 305 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1978, 1978 (2011) (“As the only place in the US health care system that 
serves all patients, [EDs] are the ‘safety net of the safety net.’”). 
30.  Fields et al., supra note 29, at 1064. 
31.  Researchers have commented that these consequences of EMTALA’s enactment 
should come as no surprise.  See INST. OF MED., supra note 18, at xv (“An unintended but 
predictable consequence of this legal duty [created by EMTALA] is a system that is 
overloaded and underfunded to carry out its mission.”). 
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A. The Fiscal Burden on Hospitals 
To understand the fiscal burden on hospitals, an overview of the 
general financial landscape hospitals operate within is necessary.  Also, 
the role EMTALA has played in exacerbating this fiscal burden—both 
as an unfunded mandate and through its direct costs—should be 
discussed.  Finally, the significant ramifications this fiscal burden has 
specifically on hospitals with EDs needs to be addressed. 
1. The General Financial Landscape Hospitals Operate Within 
The general financial outlook for many hospitals is rather bleak.  
This is indicated by the number of hospitals closing over the past few 
decades.32  In 1991 there were 5,342 community hospitals in the United 
States, and by 2011 this number decreased seven percent to 4,973.33  The 
primary reason for this trend is that hospitals face increasing financial 
pressures.34  “At least one-quarter to one-third of the hospitals in the 
United States operate with little or no profit margin . . . . ”35  From 1995 
 
32.  See TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at A-20 (reporting the number of 
community hospitals in the U.S. declining by 7% from 1991 to 2011); Michelle Nicole 
Diamond, Note, Legal Triage for Healthcare Reform: The Conflict Between the ACA and 
EMTALA, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 255, 283 (2011) (“Hospital closure rates 
skyrocketed in the last decade, especially for public hospitals and hospitals located in heavily 
uninsured communities.”). 
33.  TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at A-20.  The number of urban 
community hospitals during this period did oscillate; however, the United States experienced 
a net gain of 68 urban hospitals in this period, therefore the overall loss of 369 community 
hospitals nationally occurred entirely within the rural community hospital market.  Id.  
Between 1991 and 2011, 437 rural community hospitals closed—a loss of 18% of rural 
hospitals in the U.S.  Id. 
34.  See Maizel & Garner, supra note 19, at 1 (“Distressed hospitals in America operate 
on small or non-existent profit margins.”); Diamond, supra note 32, at 282 (“Even before 
Congress passed the ACA, many predicted that the financial pressure from treating 
undocumented immigrants would increase hospital bankruptcy and closure.”); Anemona 
Hartocollis, Other Hospitals Take Up Slack Caused by Closing of St. Vincent’s, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 8, 2010, at A29 (describing the vote to close St. Vincent Catholic Medical Centers, “the 
last full-service Catholic hospital in New York City”) (“The vote came after futile efforts to 
find a partner that would help run the hospital, which is burdened with $700 million in debt 
and is losing millions more every month.”); Nick Madigan, Los Angeles Emergency Care 
Crisis Deepens, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2004, at A8 (attributing the closure of Northridge 
Hospital Medical Center to financial pressures because “the hospital ha[d] been losing $1 
million a month for a year”). 
35.  Maizel & Garner, supra note 19, at 4; see TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 
22, at 39. 
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to 2011, the percentage of hospitals with negative operating margins 
varied between 27.7% and 42.2%.36 
To better understand why so many hospitals are operating at a loss, 
it is helpful to gain a basic understanding of how hospitals are 
compensated.37  The federal government, state governments, private 
payers, and patients are the main sources of payment for hospitals.38  
Medicare and Medicaid are the main government programs 
compensating hospitals.39  Medicare is a federal program providing 
health coverage for people over the age of sixty-five.40  Medicaid is a 
state-administered program which receives at least 50% of its funding 
from the federal government and provides coverage for health services 
similar to Medicare.41  Traditionally, individuals qualified for Medicaid 
by being sufficiently poor and falling into a particular category, such as 
being disabled;42 however, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) removes the 
 
36.  TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at A-32 (reporting 27.7% in 1996 and 
42.2% in 2000).  On average, 32.8% of hospitals experienced negative profit margins during 
1995–2011.  See id. 
37.  A detailed examination of hospital financing structures and compensation 
mechanisms is beyond the scope of this Comment.  See generally JASON H. SUSSMAN & ERIC 
A. JORDAHL, A GUIDE TO FINANCING STRATEGIES FOR HOSPITALS WITH SPECIAL 
CONSIDERATION FOR SMALLER HOSPITALS (2010), for a detailed guide on hospital 
financing strategies with emphasis on smaller hospitals, and FELIX KAUFMAN, A PRIMER ON 
HOSPITAL ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE FOR TRUSTEES AND OTHER HEALTHCARE 
PROFESSIONALS (4th ed. 2009), for a primer providing an overview of healthcare finance, 
reimbursement, and accounting. 
38.  KAUFMAN, supra note 37, at 7.  Private payers includes insurance companies.  Id. 
39.  See TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at 41 (reporting that 9.6–16.3% of 
hospital costs between 1980 and 2011 were distributed to Medicaid and 34.6–39.3% were 
distributed to Medicare, as compared to only 1.8–6.1% being distributed to other government 
programs); see also KAUFMAN, supra note 37, at 7 (listing only Medicare and Medicaid by 
name as government programs paying hospitals). 
40.  KAUFMAN, supra note 37, at 8; Lawrence Singer, Gloria Jean Ate Catfood Tonight: 
Justice and the Social Compact for Health Care in America, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 618–20 
(2005) (providing details of the Medicare program). 
41.  Maizel & Garner, supra note 19, at 2 (“Medicaid offers similar access for medical 
services on a state level for qualifying individuals, many of whom are poor.”); see KAUFMAN, 
supra note 37, at 8; Singer, supra note 40, at 620–22 (providing details of the pre-ACA 
Medicaid program). 
42.  ALISON MITCHELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42865, MEDICAID 
DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITAL PAYMENTS 1 (2013) (reporting historical Medicaid 
eligibility categories to include “low-income children, pregnant women, parents of dependent 
children, the elderly, and individuals with disabilities”); see also David Orentlicher, Rights to 
Healthcare in the United States: Inherently Unstable, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 326, 331 (2012) 
(describing Medicaid’s historical income and category requirements); Singer, supra note 40, at 
620–22 (describing the pre-ACA Medicaid program). 
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category requirement and expands eligibility to anyone falling below 
133% of the federal poverty line.43  In 2012 sixty-eight million 
Americans were enrolled in Medicaid,44 and this number is expected to 
increase as a result of these eligibility changes.45 
Since 1980 Medicare and Medicaid have become responsible for a 
greater percentage of hospital costs each year while private insurance 
companies’ percentage of hospital costs shrink.46  “Combined, Medicare 
and Medicaid pay for more than half of the annual hospital bills in 
America.”47 
This reliance on Medicare and Medicaid for payment is particularly 
troubling for hospitals because the compensation rates for both 
programs are not determined by the market, and subsequently neither 
program covers all the treatment costs for their enrollees.48  Most years 
Medicare covers a greater portion of its patients’ hospital costs than 
Medicaid;49 however, in 2011, Medicare covered 91.4% of hospital costs 
 
43.  MITCHEL, supra note 42, at 1 (noting that “recent changes [to Medicaid] will soon 
add coverage for individuals under the age of 65 with income up to 133% of the federal 
poverty level”); see Orentlicher, supra note 42, at 332 (“In 2014, . . . Medicaid finally will 
become a program for all of the poor (defined as families earning no more than 133% of the 
federal poverty level).”); Affordable Care Act, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Aff
ordableCareAct/Affordable-Care-Act.html (last visited June 11, 2015), available at http://per
ma.cc/F3R2-SM6L (detailing the ACA’s changes to Medicaid). 
44.  TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at A-12. 
45.  See Affordable Care Act, supra note 43; Caroline F. Pearson, Analysis: Medicaid 
Plans Expected to Grow 20% This Year Under ACA Expansion, AVALERE (Jan. 15, 2014), ht
tp://avalerehealth.net/expertise/managed-care/insights/analysis-medicaid-plans-expected-to-gr
ow-20-this-year-under-aca-expansion, archived at http://perma.cc/6PEV-TJPV; Christine 
Vestal, Why New Medicaid Enrollment Is Soaring, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 6, 2013), htt
p://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2013/november/06/stateline-medicaid-enrollment-increa
ses-by-state.aspx, available at http://perma.cc/ZL9W-SXWX. 
46.  TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at 41 (reporting hospital cost 
distributions by payer type: Medicaid 9.6% (1980), 12.8% (2000), and 16.3% (2011); Medicare 
34.6% (1980), 38.3% (2000), and 39.3% (2011); and private payers 41.8% (1980), 38.7% 
(2000), and 34.6% (2011)). 
47.  Maizel & Garner, supra note 19, at 2. 
48.  Id. (“The level at which Medicare and Medicaid reimburse is dictated by legislation 
and policy, not the market. By most statistics these programs fail to reimburse hospitals even 
what it costs the hospitals to provide services to the programs’ beneficiaries, let alone make a 
profit.”); see KAUFMAN, supra note 37, at 7 (“[N]either Medicare nor Medicaid covered all 
hospital costs for treating their patients.”). 
49.  TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at A-35 (reporting that Medicare 
covered a greater percentage of hospital costs than Medicaid in eighteen years out of twenty 
between 1991 and 2011); Orentlicher, supra note 42, at 333 (“Medicaid pays physicians at 
lower levels than does Medicare . . . .  According to a national survey from 1998–2003, 
Medicaid’s reimbursement rates for physicians averaged sixty-two percent of Medicare rates 
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for Medicare patients, and Medicaid covered 94.7% of hospital costs for 
Medicaid patients.50  The combined Medicare and Medicaid payment 
shortfalls for that year alone resulted in a loss of nearly $30 billion to 
U.S. hospitals.51  When the programs responsible for paying over half of 
the hospital bills in the country actually cost hospitals billions of dollars 
in the aggregate, it should come as no surprise that so many hospitals 
are operating at a loss. 
The losses incurred by hospitals for treating Medicare and Medicaid 
patients are largely due to the PPS adopted in 1983.52  Prior to 1983 a 
Medicare patient went to a hospital, was treated, and then Medicare 
would reimburse the hospital for the services it provided and any 
reasonable costs the hospital incurred in treating the patient.53  This 
system of receiving payment after services were performed based on the 
actual costs of the treatment administered was referred to as a 
“retrospective payment system.”54  In 1983 Congress changed the way 
the Medicare program reimbursed hospitals for inpatient services from a 
 
in 1998, rising to sixty-nine percent of Medicare rates by 2003.”); see also Singer, supra note 
40, at 622 (“Medicaid reimbursements for services are exceptionally poor, often covering less 
than one-half of service costs, and then only after significant delays in payment.”). 
50.  TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at A-35.  These figures include 
Medicare and Medicaid Disproportionate Share Payments.  Id.  For a discussion of 
Disproportionate Share Payments, see supra notes 74–82 and accompanying text. 
51.  TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at A-36. 
52.  See Welzien, supra note 1, at 22 (“In 1983 Congress restructured how the federal 
government’s Medicare program paid for inpatient hospital services. . . .  [T]he new structure 
implemented a [PPS]. . . .”); see also KAUFMAN, supra note 37, at 9 (“A new set of legislative 
initiatives resulted in the [PPS] for Medicare in 1983.”).  Although the 1983 legislative 
changes were to the Medicare program specifically, Medicaid programs adopted the PPS 
approach in 1986, as did private insurance companies in the latter half of the 1980s.  
KAUFMAN, supra note 37, at 9.  Accordingly, the following description of the PPS 
appropriately describes the system currently in place for Medicare, Medicaid, and private 
payer reimbursement to hospitals. 
53.  See Welzien, supra note 1, at 22 (“The previous structure involved a retrospective 
payment system in which Medicare reimbursed the hospitals for the services and expenditures 
that the hospital incurred in treating the Medicare beneficiary.  The hospital simply used 
whatever resources were necessary to treat the patient, and after providing treatment would 
receive reimbursement for any reasonable costs incurred and services provided.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
54.  Id. (“The previous structure involved a retrospective payment system in which 
Medicare reimbursed the hospitals for the services and expenditures that the hospital 
incurred in treating the Medicare beneficiary.”). 
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retrospective payment system to a PPS55—the system which remains in 
place today. 
Under the PPS not much changed from the patient’s prospective.  
The Medicare patient still goes to a hospital and is diagnosed, treated, 
and discharged similar to the old system.56  The change occurs once the 
patient is discharged, at which point the hospital assigns the patient to a 
Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) according to the patient’s diagnosis 
and the procedures performed by the hospital.57   Each DRG has a 
predetermined amount that Medicare reimburses the hospital based 
upon estimated costs of treatment for the DRG.58  If the actual cost of 
treatment is less than the DRG’s predetermined amount, the hospital 
keeps the excess.59  If, on the other hand, the actual cost of treatment is 
greater than the predetermined amount, the hospital loses money.60  
Considering the billions of dollars in payment shortfalls to hospitals 
from Medicare and Medicaid annually, it is safe to say that many 
hospitals lose more money under the PPS than they make in excess of 
their costs. 
As if the financial burden placed on hospitals by Medicare and 
Medicaid was not enough, EMTALA exacerbates hospitals’ financial 
problems by virtue of being an unfunded mandate. 
2. The Costs of EMTALA Being an Unfunded Mandate 
 Medicare and Medicaid payment shortfalls are problems that all 
hospitals must contend with; however, the financial troubles affecting 
 
55.  Id. (“In 1983 Congress restructured how the federal government’s Medicare 
program paid for inpatient hospital services.  The previous structure involved a retrospective 
payment system . . . .  [T]he new structure implemented a [PPS] . . . .”). 
56.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
57.  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., ACUTE CARE HOSPITAL INPATIENT PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: PAYMENT 
SYSTEM FACT SHEET SERIES 2 (2013) (“Discharges are assigned to diagnosis-related groups 
(DRG), a classification system that groups similar clinical conditions (diagnoses) and the 
procedures furnished by the hospital during the stay.”).  A patient’s assigned DRG is 
determined on the basis of a “principal diagnosis and up to 24 secondary diagnoses,”  Id.  In 
2011 there were 745 DRGs which patients could be classified under.  See Welzien, supra note 
1, at 22. 
58.  Welzien, supra note 1, at 22.  See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., supra note 57, at 3–5 (detailing the Inpatient PPS’s payment rates and how they are 
set). 
59.  Welzien, supra note 1, at 22. 
60.  Id. 
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hospitals are even more acute for those with EDs.61  During 1991–2011 
EDs closed at greater rates than hospitals.62  Specifically, there were 
5,108 EDs operating in 1991, and by 2011 that number had dropped to 
4,461—a loss of 647 EDs (12.7%) nationwide.63  A recent study found 
“economic drivers [to be] associated with ED closures.”64  One news 
article even reported that seventy EDs and trauma centers in California 
alone closed between 1990 and 2004 due in part to underfinancing.65 
The financial troubles leading to ED closures are due in large part to 
EMTALA being an unfunded mandate.66  EMTALA requires EDs to 
provide medical screenings and stabilizing treatment to uninsured and 
indigent patients67 but does not provide any federal funding to pay for 
this care.68  In 2011, 48.6 million people—15.7% of the U.S. 
population—were uninsured.69   That same year hospitals lost $41.1 
billion dollars from providing uncompensated care to the uninsured.70  
From 1986—the year EMTALA was promulgated—through 2011, 
hospitals lost $573.5 billion from providing uncompensated care to the 
 
61.  See Eastaugh, supra note 29, at 7, 11 (“The emergency department is seen as a 
financial weak spot . . . .  If a hospital closes its ED, it reduces those financial losses. . . . [¶]  
Emergency departments in America are disappearing at an alarming rate.  Those that remain 
face . . . budgetary shortfalls.”). 
62.  See TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at A-20, A-28. 
63.  Id. at A-28.  Compared to the loss of 7% of hospitals during this same time period.  
See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
64.  Hsia et al., supra note 29, at 1983 (“Our nationwide analysis of ED closures between 
1990 and 2007 identified several risk factors that suggest economic drivers are associated with 
ED closures.  Hospital-specific characteristics related to higher risk of closure were safety-net 
status, for-profit ownership, and low profit margin.”). 
65.  Madigan, supra note 34. 
66.  See, e.g., Fields et al., supra note 29, at 1064 (referring to EMTALA as an unfunded 
mandate); Katherine Diaz Vickery, Kori Sauser & Matthew M. Davis, Policy Responses to 
Demand for Health Care Access: From the Individual to the Population, 309 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 665, 665 (2013) (referring to EMTALA as “an unfunded mandate for provision of 
emergency care”). 
67.  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)–(b) (2012). 
68.  See id. § 1395dd (containing no funding provision for the care it mandates). 
69.  TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at A-10. 
70.  AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N., AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION: UNCOMPENSATED 
HOSPITAL CARE COST FACT SHEET 3 (2013).  Uncompensated care cost is a combination of 
a hospital’s charity care and bad debt.  Id. at 2.  It is appropriate to combine charity care and 
bad debt because “[b]ad debt is often generated by medically indigent and/or uninsured 
patients”; therefore, there is no meaningful distinction between the two categories.  Id. 
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uninsured.71  These losses are apart from the Medicare and Medicaid 
payment shortages previously discussed.72 
  National data indicates uninsured patients visit EDs proportionate 
to or slightly higher than their percentage of the population;73 however, 
this national data does not paint a full picture. Some EDs—safety net 
EDs—“provide a disproportionate share of services to Medicaid and 
uninsured persons.”74  In 2007, approximately two thirds of all EDs were 
classified as safety net EDs due to the increasing number of uninsured 
and Medicaid patients visiting EDs in the late 1990s and 2000s.75  By 
virtue of providing services to a disproportionate amount of uninsured 
and Medicaid patients, these safety net EDs burden themselves with a 
disproportionate share of uncompensated care costs.76  According to a 
recent study, along with these additional costs comes the increased risk 
of being forced to close their EDs.77 
In recognition of the additional financial burden safety net hospitals 
are under, Congress established Medicaid Disproportionate Share 
 
71.  See id. at 3. 
72.  Id. at 1 (“Uncompensated care excludes other unfunded costs of care, such as 
underpayment from Medicaid and Medicare.”). 
73.  Compare U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-347, HOSPITAL 
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS: CROWDING CONTINUES TO OCCUR, AND SOME PATIENTS 
WAIT LONGER THAN RECOMMENDED TIME FRAMES 39 (2009) (reporting self-pay and no 
charge/charity patients accounting for 16% of ED visits in 2001, 15% in 2002, 15% in 2003, 
17% in 2004, 17% in 2005, and 17% in 2006), with TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 
22, at A-10 (reporting 14.6% uninsured in 2001, 15.2% in 2002, 15.6% in 2003, 14.9% in 2004, 
15.3% in 2005, and 15.8% in 2006). 
74.  Ning Tang et al., Trends and Characteristics of US Emergency Department Visits, 
1997–2007, 304 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 664, 664 (2010) (“Among all EDs, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) further identified a subset as safety-net EDs because these 
EDs provide a disproportionate share of services to Medicaid and uninsured persons.  
Specifically, safety-net EDs are facilities that provide more than 30% of total ED visits to 
persons with Medicaid, more than 30% of total ED visits to uninsured individuals, or a 
combined Medicaid and uninsured patient population greater than 40%.”). 
75.  See id. at 668 (“Because of the increasing numbers of visits by persons with 
Medicaid or no insurance, EDs classified as safety net increased 46% during this time period 
and now constitute almost two-thirds of all EDs.”).  According to the CDC, 1,770 EDs (43% 
of all EDs) were classified as safety net EDs in 2000, and this number grew to 2,489 EDs 
(63% of all EDs) by 2007.  Id. at 667. 
76.  See MITCHEL, supra note 42, at 1–2. 
77.  Hsia et al., supra note 29, at 1980 (reporting safety net EDs had 50% chance of 
remaining open after the study period, and non safety-net EDs had 74% chance of remaining 
open).  Other factors that the study determined increase the chance of ED closure include 
low profit margins, for-profit status, and serving uninsured communities.  Id. at 1981, 1983–84. 
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Hospital (DSH) payments in 198178 and Medicare DSH payments in 
1985.79  The purpose of both DSH payment programs is to reduce the 
economic losses hospitals suffer as a result of caring for a 
disproportionate number of Medicaid or Medicare patients, 
respectively, and uninsured patients.80  While Congress had the right 
idea in creating DSH payment programs—providing additional funding 
for hospitals suffering the greatest financial losses for caring for the 
uninsured and underinsured—the DSH system is simply inadequate to 
handle the amount of losses hospitals suffer from payment shortfalls.81  
Since DSH payments do not even amount to the level of Medicare and 
Medicaid payment shortages to qualifying hospitals,82 it would be 
incorrect to view the DSH payments as funding EMTALA-mandated 
services. 
 
78.  See MITCHEL, supra note 42, at 2 (“Medicaid DSH payments were established in the 
Ominbus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA 1981, P.L. 97-35) . . . .  The inclusion of 
this Medicaid DSH provision . . . recognized that hospitals serving disproportionate share of 
low income patients are particularly dependent on Medicaid payments because low income 
patients are mostly Medicaid enrollees and uninsured individuals.  Hospitals often do not 
receive payment for services rendered to uninsured patients, and Medicaid provider payment 
rates are generally lower than the rates paid by Medicare and private insurance.” (citation 
omitted)).  See generally Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Payments, 
MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/
Financing-and-Reimbursement/Medicaid-Disproportionate-Share-Hospital-DSH-Payments.h
tml (last visited June 11, 2015), available at http://perma.cc/R64P-9VQ6 (government website 
pertaining to Medicaid DSH payments). 
79.  Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH), CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/dsh.html (last modified May 14, 2015, 
1:58 PM), available at http://perma.cc/ZVK3-M47S (“The Medicare DSH adjustment 
provision under section 1886(d) (5) (F) of the Act was enacted by section 9105 of the 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985 and became effective 
for discharges occurring on or after May 1, 1986.”); see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 57, at 2 (providing a brief overview of how hospitals qualify for 
Medicare DHS adjustment).  For a detailed explanation of the DSH payment system, see 
generally MITCHEL, supra note 42, at 1–2, and COREY DAVIS, NAT’L. HEALTH LAW 
PROGRAM, Q&A: DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITAL PAYMENTS AND THE MEDICAID 
EXPANSION 1 (2012) (comparing the Medicaid and Medicare DSH programs). 
80.  See MITCHEL, supra note 42, at 1–2; DAVIS, supra note 79, at 1. 
81.  See Tiana Mayere Lee, An EMTALA Primer: The Impact of Changes in the 
Emergency Medicine Landscape on EMTALA Compliance and Enforcement, 13 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 145, 168 (2004). 
82.  See DAVIS, supra note 79, at 2–3 (detailing the payments made by both the 
Medicare and Medicaid DSH payment programs); MITCHEL, supra note 42, at  4–7 (2013) 
(explaining that DSH allotments are the maximum amount of funds that a state can receive 
for DSH payments and “[e]ach state’s allotment can be no more than the greater of the prior 
year’s allotment or 12% of its total Medicaid medical assistance expenditures”). 
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Unfortunately the ACA does not offer a solution for these payment 
shortfalls to hospitals from Medicare and Medicaid; in fact the problem 
is only poised to get worse,83 especially for hospitals with safety net EDs 
that rely upon DSH payments.84  The ACA includes a number of 
provisions cutting payments for health care costs.85  One of the largest 
areas of health care funding scheduled to be cut is DSH funding: 
Medicare DSH funding is scheduled to be cut by 75%86 and Medicaid 
DSH funds will be reduced by $18.1 billion between 2014 and 2020.87 
The rationale behind the DSH funding cuts is that the ACA’s 
individual mandate will result in a substantial number of previously 
uninsured individuals becoming insured, which will then decrease 
hospitals’ uncompensated care costs.88  This rationale is problematic 
because it overlooks the significant portion of uncompensated care costs 
created by uninsured undocumented immigrants, who will remain 
uninsured under the ACA.89  By reducing the only source of funding 
that even attempts to lessen the financial impact of EMTALA’s 
mandated care, Congress is ensuring that EMTALA remains an 
unfunded mandate and hospitals will continue to struggle financially.  
While the bulk of the financial problems EMTALA creates for EDs are 
in the form of uncompensated care costs, EMTALA also places direct 
costs on hospitals. 
 
83.  See Orentlicher, supra note 42, at 335–36 (“But ACA does not address important 
problems with Medicaid. . . .  ACA almost guarantees that Medicare will cut reimbursement 
rates.”); Diamond, supra note 32, at 283 (“Although the ACA did not single-handedly create 
hospital financial difficulty, it exacerbates the problem to the point of widespread medical 
crisis.”). 
84.  See DAVIS, supra note 79, at 4–6 (providing a brief overview of the ACA’s changes 
to both DSH payment programs); MITCHEL, supra note 42, at 10–11 (detailing the ACA’s 
Medicaid DSH payment reductions). 
85.  Diamond, supra note 32, at 266 (“[T]he ACA implements provisions to reduce the 
amount of money the United States spends on healthcare each year.”); see Maizel & Garner, 
supra note 19, at 2 (“Unfortunately, the Affordable Care Act provides for approximately 
$155 billion in cuts in hospital payments over the coming decade.”). 
86.  DAVIS, supra note 79, at 4 n.22, 5; Diamond, supra note 32, at 266–67. 
87.  42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(f)(7) (2012); see DAVIS, supra note 79, at 4 n.22. 
88.  DAVIS, supra note 79, at 4; MITCHEL, supra note 42, at 10–11; Diamond, supra note 
32, at 267. 
89.  See Maizel & Garner, supra note 19, at 3; Diamond, supra note 32, at 257–58, 271–
86 (detailing the conflict between the ACA and EMTALA regarding the cost of care for 
undocumented immigrants).  See generally Lebedinski, supra note 19. 
 1774 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1759 
3. EMTALA’s Direct Costs to Hospitals 
EMTALA imposes direct costs to hospitals for violation of the 
statute beyond the uncompensated care costs to EDs arising from 
EMTALA being an unfunded mandate.  These direct costs include civil 
monetary penalties, termination of Medicare participation, and liability 
under a private cause of action.90 
The maximum civil penalty for a hospital is either $25,000 or $50,000 
per violation depending on the number of beds the hospital has.91  A 
hospital that violates EMTALA may also be excluded from 
participating in the Medicare program.92  Between 1986 and 2001, 13 
hospitals were excluded from participating in the Medicare program due 
to EMTALA violations.93  The maximum civil penalty for physicians 
who negligently violate the statute is $50,000 per violation.94  Physicians 
that grossly, flagrantly, or repeatedly violate the statute can be excluded 
from participating in state or federal medical reimbursement 
programs.95 
The statute also creates a private cause of action for medical 
facilities financially injured from an improper transfer to their facility 
and for “[a]ny individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of 
a participating hospital’s violation” of an EMTALA requirement.96  The 
statute of limitations is two years from the time of the violation.97  
Hospitals incur a financial loss anytime a suit is brought for an 
EMTALA violation regardless of whether or not the hospital ED is 
found guilty of an EMTALA violation: if the hospital is guilty it must 
pay the judgment in addition to its own litigation expenses, and if the 
hospital is found not guilty it will still incur financial losses in the form of 
litigation expenses. 
 
90.  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d) (2012). 
91.  Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A).  The maximum civil monetary penalty is $50,000 unless the 
hospital has less than 100 beds, in which case the maximum civil monetary penalty is 
$25,000.  Id. 
92.  See id. § 1395dd(d)(3); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND LABOR ACT: THE ENFORCEMENT 
PROCESS 6–8 (2001) (detailing the enforcement mechanisms for EMTALA). 
93.  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 92, at 8. 
94.  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B). 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. § 1395dd(d)(2). 
97.  Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C). 
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4. Ramifications of Fiscal Burden for EDs 
In recent years this increased financial burden has been a substantial 
factor leading to the closure of many EDs, which in turn has placed a 
greater financial burden on those EDs remaining in operation.98  As 
more hospitals and EDs close, their patients are forced to seek care at 
the remaining hospitals and EDs.99  This reallocation of patients 
includes a reallocation of uninsured patients along with the cost of their 
care.100  The hospitals that were barely getting by101 will be unable to 
absorb the additional uncompensated care costs for their new uninsured 
patients and eventually will be forced to close their ED or the hospital 
in general, and so the cycle will continue.  If EMTALA remains as an 
unfunded mandate, the end result will be too few EDs to appropriately 
handle the health care needs of both insured and uninsured alike.102  In 
addition to the financial burden EMTALA places on hospitals with EDs 
leading to this cycle of ED and hospital closures, EMTALA also 
contributes to quality of care problems in those EDs remaining open—
specifically, EMTALA is a contributing cause of ED overcrowding. 
B. ED Overcrowding 
As the nation’s health care safety net, EDs have suffered from and 
continue to battle overcrowding.103 In March 2010, over a third of all 
hospitals reported their ED being at or over capacity.104  Capacity issues 
 
98.  See, e.g., Hartocollis, supra note 34 (commenting upon the additional pressures 
placed on other area hospitals as a result of St. Vincent’s closing). 
99.  See id. 
100.  See Madigan, supra note 34. 
101.  See generally Maizel & Garner, supra note 19 (discussing hospitals operating at low 
or negative profit margins). 
102.  See INST. OF MED., supra note 18, at xv. 
103.  See, e.g., CHOUDHRY ET AL., supra note 25, at 1 (“Demand for ED visits is on the 
rise and EDs are becoming overcrowded . . . .”); Robert W. Derlet & John R. Richards, 
Overcrowding in the Nation’s Emergency Departments: Complex Causes and Disturbing 
Effects, 35 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 63, 63 (2000) (“[T]he issue of overcrowding in 
emergency departments has become a significant national problem.”); Eastaugh, supra note 
29, at 11 (“[Emergency departments] that remain face a daily ordeal of overcrowding and 
budgetary shortfalls.”); Manya F. Newton et al., Uninsured Adults Presenting to US 
Emergency Departments: Assumptions vs Data, 300 J. AM. MED. ASS’N  1914, 1914 (2008) 
(“Emergency Departments . . . today are in crisis, facing significant overcrowding, 
unreimbursed care, and long waiting times.”); Philip J. Hilts, Many Exit Emergency Room 
Before Getting Needed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1991, at A18. 
104.  TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at 33. 
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were worse for urban hospitals, half of which reported their ED being at 
or over capacity at that time.105 
ED overcrowding is a multifactorial problem facing our nation’s 
emergency health care system.106  Commonly cited factors contributing 
to ED overcrowding include frequent-flyer patients, increased patient 
volume, non-urgent visits, inadequate staffing, hospital bed shortages, 
inpatient boarding, and EMTALA.107 
1. EMTALA’s Contribution to ED Overcrowding 
The passage of EMTALA opened the doors of EDs to America’s 
uninsured,108 many of whom began using the ED as they would a 
primary care facility.109  Conservatively, one-third of all ED visits in the 
mid-2000s were for conditions that could be treated in a primary care 
setting.110  Using an ED in this manner is a misuse of the ED.111  Studies 
 
105.  Id. 
106.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 73, at 9 (“In terms of factors 
that contribute to crowding, we reported that crowding is a complex issue and no single factor 
tends to explain why crowding occurs.”); Derlet & Richards, supra note 103, at 64 (“ED 
overcrowding results from multiple complex and often interwoven issues.”). 
107.  See CHOUDHRY ET AL., supra note 25, at 1; Derlet & Richards, supra note 103, at 
64–66 (listing causes of overcrowding to include “increased complexity and acuity of patients 
presenting to the ED,” “overall increase in patient volume,” “managed care problems,” 
hospital bed shortages, and staffing shortages (bold font omitted)); Nathan R. Hoot & 
Dominik Aronsky, Systemic Review of Emergency Department Crowding: Causes, Effects, and 
Solutions, 52 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 126, 128–30 (2008) (listing the most commonly 
studied causes of ED overcrowding as non-urgent visits, frequent-flyer patients, influenza 
season, inadequate staffing, inpatient boarding, hospital bed shortages); Lisa Belkin, Houston 
Faces Crisis in Emergency Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1989, at 22. 
108.  See infra Part III.B. 
109.  See Singer, supra note 40, at 625 (“EMTALA incentivizes individuals to seek care 
at the E.D., because they know they will be seen, even though a less-intensive setting may be 
more appropriate.”); Emergency in the Emergency Rooms, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2006, at A16; 
see also Lee, supra note 81, at 166 (“Uninsured persons and Medicaid enrollees often seek 
care in the emergency department, rather than in a physician’s office.”). 
110.  CHOUDHRY ET AL., supra note 25, at 2 (“At least one-third of all ED visits are 
‘avoidable’ in that they were non-urgent or ambulatory care sensitive . . . and therefore 
treatable in primary care settings.”).  Other studies have found the percentage of emergency 
department visits that were avoidable to be much higher; for example, researchers “found 
that roughly 75% of all visits to New York City EDs were avoidable, [and] previous studies 
from the National Center for Health Statistics found that as many as 55% of ED visits were 
non-urgent.”  Id. 
111.  The purpose of an ED is to provide immediate medical care to patients suffering 
from an emergency medical condition; therefore, a patient seeking medical care for a non-
emergent medical condition is using the ED contrary to its intended purpose.  This 
understanding of an ED’s purpose is suggested by the name emergency department. 
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show that underinsured and uninsured patients misuse EDs in 
disproportionate numbers.112  This misuse of EDs by the uninsured has 
contributed to the problem of overcrowding.113 
Although the degree to which uninsured patients are to blame for 
overcrowding in EDs is debated, there is a consensus that uninsured 
patients are at least a contributing factor to the problem of ED 
overcrowding.114 A 2013 study “sought to determine whether EMTALA 
affects patients’ use of the ED and whether modifying EMTALA might 
potentially reduce ED utilization.”115  The study found that (1) many 
patients were aware of the legal obligation that EMTALA created on 
the part of hospitals, (2) patients that were aware of the legal obligation 
created by EMTALA were more likely to use the ED, and (3) 
modification of EMTALA could decrease ED crowding.116 
 
Furthermore, this understanding of an ED’s purpose seems to be Congress’s understanding 
since EMTALA requires EDs to screen for and, if found, stabilize emergency medical 
conditions only, not non-emergent medical conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)–(b) (2012).  
Even after the enactment of EMTALA, EDs retain the right to turn away patients with non-
emergent medical conditions.  Cf. id. 
112.  CHOUDHRY ET AL., supra note 25, at 2 (“Medicaid beneficiaries and the uninsured 
also account for more avoidable ED visits.  EDs serving higher proportions of patients that 
are Medicaid eligible or uninsured have 25% more non-urgent cases presenting, 10% more 
emergent conditions presenting that are primary care treatable, and fewer injury and 
unavoidable emergent conditions presenting compared to other EDs.”); see Singer, supra 
note 40, at 622 (discussing the disincentives for health care providers to service Medicaid 
enrollees).   
113.  See Editorial, Emergency Room Delays, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at A18 
(“Uninsured patients—and those who have no primary care doctor—flock to emergency 
rooms for routine coverage, clogging the system.”).  It stands to reason that if the patients 
misusing the ED sought care in an appropriate care setting, such as a primary care setting or 
health center, rather than the ED, then the number of patients in EDs would reduce and not 
be as overcrowded.  See generally CHOUDHRY ET AL., supra note 25, at 3–5 (discussing 
studies finding that health centers reduce emergency department visits especially by 
uninsured and underinsured patients who combined comprised 75.3% of health center 
patients in 2005). 
114.  See Stephen Zuckerman & Yu-Chu Shen, Characteristics of Occasional and 
Frequent Emergency Department Users: Do Insurance Coverage and Access to Care Matter?, 
42 MED. CARE 176 (2004) (finding that some uninsured adults are frequent ED users and 
publicly insured adults have the greatest odds of being frequent ED users); Laura D. Hermer, 
The Scapegoat: EMTALA and Emergency Department Overcrowding, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 695, 
699 (2006) (arguing EMTALA is only a minor factor in ED overcrowding). 
115.  William M. McDonnell et al., Does the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor 
Act Affect Emergency Department Use?, 44 J. EMERGENCY MED. 209, 210 (2013). 
116.  Id. at 213 (“[T]he current high degree of public awareness about hospitals’ legal 
obligations to provide emergency care suggests that EMTALA at least has the potential to 
affect patients’ emergency care-seeking behaviors. . . .  [P]atients aware of EMTALA 
principles were more likely than other patients to have at least five additional ED visits in a 
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2. Consequences of Overcrowding 
This problem of overcrowding creates quality of care issues in the 
hospital setting.117  Studies show that ED overcrowding results in 
adverse patient outcomes, such as increased patient mortality rates.118  
Overcrowding also results in delayed patient treatment that can result in 
patients “experience[ing] prolonged pain and suffering unnecessarily.”119  
Long wait times lead to patient dissatisfaction, and in some cases 
patients leave the ED without receiving any care.120  “Patients who 
[leave] the ED without being seen [are] twice as likely to report 
worsened health problems.”121  ED overcrowding also results in 
increased time on ambulance diversion—hospitals divert ambulances to 
other EDs because their ED is at or over capacity—which increases 
transport times and delays care.122  In March 2010, 22% of all hospitals 
and 45% of urban hospitals reported spending time on ambulance 
diversion within the previous twelve months.123 
Before solutions to the unintended consequences of EMTALA can 
be considered, a more detailed examination of the statute is required in 
order to better understand what its intended consequences were.  
 
year.  These associations suggest that not only do many patients know about the law, but also 
that such awareness may lead to increased ED use. . . .  The most important policy implication 
of our observed association between EMTALA awareness and increased ED use may be the 
possibility of reducing ED crowding by modifying or eliminating EMTALA.”). 
117.  See Derlet & Richards, supra note 103, at 66–67. 
118.  Hoot & Aronsky, supra note 107, at 130 (reporting multiple studies finding 
increased patient mortality rates associated with ED overcrowding); see Derlet & Richards, 
supra note 103, at 66 (“Poor outcome has resulted from overcrowded conditions at some 
hospitals.  For example, . . . a patient sat in the hallway for nearly 8 hours with an enlarging 
subdural hematoma because the ED staff, stretched past its limit, was too busy to evaluate 
him. . . .  Feeling rushed and under time pressure results in errors, risk of poor outcome, and 
risk of malpractice or legal action.”). 
119.  Derlet & Richards, supra note 103, at 66; see Hoot & Aronsky, supra note 107, at 
130–31 (reporting studies finding treatment delays associated with ED overcrowding). 
120.  Derlet & Richards, supra note 103, at 66; Hoot & Aronsky, supra note 107, at 131. 
121.  Hoot & Aronsky, supra note 107, at 131. 
122.  Derlet & Richards, supra note 103, at 66; Hoot & Aronsky, supra note 107, at 
130−31. 
123.  TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at 33.  Twenty-seven percent of 
hospitals reported ED overcrowding as the number one factor contributing to ambulance 
diversion.  Id. at 34.  Forty-two percent of hospitals reported a lack of staffed critical care 
beds as the number one factor contributing to ambulance diversion.  Id. 
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III. EXAMINING EMTALA 
A. Congresss’s Intent in Enacting EMTALA 
Congress passed EMTALA in direct response to the nation’s 
problem of patient dumping124 as part of the Consolidated Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985.125  Patient dumping is 
when a hospital refuses a person emergency medical care due to the 
person’s uninsured status or inability to pay.126  Some cases of patient 
dumping included the patient being transferred to another hospital, 
typically a public hospital, without first being sufficiently stabilized; in 
other words, the patient who was unable to pay for medical care was 
dumped on another hospital.127  Patient dumping was a practice that 
received a great deal of attention from the press and occurred at 
hospitals nationwide.128 
The House Committee on Ways and Means (HCWM) explained the 
purpose of EMTALA quite clearly: 
The Committee is greatly concerned about the increasing 
number of reports that hospital emergency rooms are refusing to 
accept or treat patients with emergency conditions if the patient 
does not have medical insurance.  The Committee is most 
concerned that medically unstable patients are not being treated 
appropriately.  There have been reports of situations where 
treatment was simply not provided. In numerous other instances, 
patients in an unstable condition have been transferred 
 
124.  Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 
§ 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 164–67 (1986) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C § 1395dd (2012)); H.R. 
REP. NO. 99-241, pt. 1, at 27 (1985). 
125.  Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S. Code). 
126.  Elizabeth A. Larson, Note, Did Congress Intend to Give Patients the Right to 
Demand and Receive Inappropriate Medical Treatments?: EMTALA Reexamined in Light of 
Baby K, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1425, 1425; Bera, supra note 20, at 617; Treiger, supra note 1, at 
1186–87. 
127.  W. Adam Malizio, Note, Moses v. Providence Hospital: The Sixth Circuit Dumps 
the Federal Regulations of the Patient Anti-Dumping Statute, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 213, 214 (2010).  Patients would be transferred to public hospitals because public 
hospitals were required by the Hill-Burton Act to provide some medical services to “persons 
unable to pay.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 53.111 (2014). 
128.  See, e.g., Edward Iwata, East Bay Hospitals: Patient-Dumping Charges Probed, S.F. 
CHRONICLE, Dec. 18, 1985, at 6; Robert Pear, Tax for Medicare Rejected in House, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 24, 1985, at A13; Robert Reinhold, Treating an Outbreak of Patient Dumping in 
Texas, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1986, at E4; Howard Wolinsky, Fivefold Rise in ‘Patient 
Dumping’ Found, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 20, 1987, at 24. 
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improperly, sometimes without the consent of the receiving 
hospital.129 
The HCWM is very clearly referring to patient dumping in its 
comments.  The HCWM went on to acknowledge that the then-recent 
change to the PPS may have increased the instances of patient 
dumping.130  In passing EMTALA, the HCWM wanted “to provide a 
strong assurance that pressures for greater hospital efficiency [were] not 
to be construed as license to ignore traditional community 
responsibilities and loosen historic standards.”131  The traditional 
responsibilities and historic standards referred to by the HCWM were 
hospitals’ traditional role of providing care to the poor.132  In other 
words, EMTALA was Congress’s attempt to ensure that uninsured 
patients with emergency medical needs would still be cared for by 
hospitals despite the pressures placed on hospitals by the PPS to do 
otherwise. 
The direct connection between EMTALA’s enactment and 
uninsured patients in need of emergency care is further illustrated by 
the House Judiciary Committee’s commentary: “In recent years there 
has been a growing concern about the provision of adequate emergency 
room services to individuals who seek care, particularly as to the 
indigent and uninsured.”133  Just like the HCWM, the House Judiciary 
Committee’s comments regarding EMTALA clearly refer to the act of 
patient dumping and its members concerns over patient dumping. 
The views expressed by the HCWM and the House Judiciary 
Committee that EMTALA was a direct response to patient dumping are 
further supported by comments made by California Representative 
Fortney Stark, a sponsor of the Act.134  Representative Stark began his 
floor statement by describing the problem of patient dumping facing the 
nation.135  Next, he recounted two cases of patient dumping in great 
detail, which he thought would not have occurred if the patients were 
 
129.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, pt. 1, at 27 (1985). 
130.  Id.; see also supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text (detailing the PPS). 
131.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, pt. 1, at 27. 
132.  See Welzien, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
133.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, pt. 3, at 5. 
134.  131 CONG. REC. 35,813 (1985) (statement of Rep. Fortney H. Stark). 
135.  Id. (“Mr. Speaker, an estimated 200,000 patients are refused care at hospital 
emergency rooms each year because they cannot afford to pay.  This is known as ‘dumping,’ 
which is the practice of transferring medically unstable indigent patients from private 
hospitals to local public hospitals.  It is a growing problem with tragic results.”) 
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insured.136  Throughout his entire floor statement, the only purpose that 
Representative Stark stated for enacting EMTALA was “to prevent this 
kind of dumping of indigent patients.”137 
Members of the Senate also understood EMTALA to be a direct 
response to patient dumping that was solely concerned with the 
emergency care of uninsured patients.  For example, when speaking 
about the Senate version of EMTALA, Utah Senator Orrin Hatch 
stated,  
The intent of this bill is honorable, that is to address concerns 
about inadequate health care for our citizens who do not have 
health insurance or who are “underinsured”. . . .  There have 
been disturbing reports about hospitals referring, and in some 
instances refusing to treat patients who present themselves for 
care, but who don’t have health insurance.  Others apparently 
require a substantial cash deposit from uninsured patients before 
admitting the individual for care.138 
Minnesota Senator David Durenberger was also very clear about his 
understanding of EMTALA’s purpose when he addressed the Senate.  
After mentioning two recent news stories about patient dumping, he 
stated: 
[T]he practice of rejecting indigent patients in life threatening 
situations for economic reasons alone is unconscionable. . . .  All 
Americans, rich or poor, deserve access to quality health 
care. . . .  The purpose of this amendment is to send a clear signal 
to the hospital community, public and private alike, that all 
Americans, regardless of wealth or status, should know that a 
hospital will provide what services it can when they are truly in 
physical distress.139 
Senators Kennedy, Dole, Heinz, and Proxmire all made statements 
similar to Senator Durenberger’s statement, each explaining the need 
for EMTALA in terms of stopping patient dumping specifically.140 
 
136.  Id. at 35,814. (“Clearly, if these patients had been middle class with health 
insurance they never would have faced the horrors that they encountered.”) 
137.  Id. 
138.  Larson, supra note 126, at 1430–31 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-
146, at 460–61 (1985)).  
139.  131 CONG. REC. 28,568 (1985) (statement of Sen. Durenberger). 
140.  Id. at 28,569 (statements of Sen. Kennedy, Sen. Dole, Sen. Heinz, and Sen. 
Proxmire). 
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Given how clearly the legislators drew the connection between 
EMTALA’s enactment and their desire to stop patient dumping 
specifically, the language of the statute is rather surprising.  To better 
understand why the courts would be confused by the inconsistency 
between the Legislature’s clear intent and the statutes’ text, the statute 
itself must be examined. 
B. EMTALA: Statute and Regulations 
EMTALA applies to EDs within hospitals that are Medicare 
participants.141  A hospital’s duties under EMTALA are triggered when 
“any individual . . . comes to the emergency department and a request is 
made on the individual’s behalf for examination or treatment for a 
medical condition.”142  The individual does not have to be a Medicare 
participant or Medicare eligible, even though the statue only applies to 
hospitals participating in the Medicare program.143   
Once the request for an examination or treatment is made, the 
medical screening portion of EMTALA is triggered.144  “[T]he hospital 
must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination . . . to 
determine whether or not an emergency medical condition . . . exists.”145  
While the statute defines an “emergency medical condition,” it does not 
define an “appropriate medical screening.”146  The medical screening 
examination is not judged by a national standard; rather, a hospital is 
only required to perform a medical screening “within the capability” of 
its own ED, and the screening must lead to “reasonable clinical 
confidence” as to whether an emergency medical condition exists.147 
If it is determined through the medical screening examination that 
the individual has an emergency medical condition, then the hospital 
 
141.  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a), (e)(2) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 413.65(a)(2) (2014) (defining 
provider based status). 
142.  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). 
143.  Id. § 1395dd(a), (e)(2); Lee, supra note 81, at 151. 
144.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id. § 1395dd(e). 
147.  See id. § 1395dd(a); 1 HEALTH LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 14:28 (2014) (“A MSE is 
the process required to reach, with reasonable clinical confidence, the point at which it can be 
determined whether the individual has an EMC or not. . . .  The MSE must be appropriate to 
the individuals’ presenting signs and symptoms, as well as the capability and capacity of the 
hospital.”); Beverly Cohen, Disentangling EMTALA from Medical Malpractice: Revising 
EMTALA’s Screening Standard to Differentiate Between Ordinary Negligence and 
Discriminatory Denials of Care, 82 TUL. L. REV. 645, 656 (2007). 
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must “stabilize the medical condition,” or transfer the individual to a 
different medical facility.148  Even when a hospital is going to transfer an 
individual with an emergency medical condition, it is typically required 
to stabilize the individual first.149  An individual is “stabilized” when “no 
material deterioration of the [emergency medical] condition is likely . . . 
to result from or occur during the transfer of an individual.”150  
“Transfer” within the context of EMTALA includes discharging an 
individual.151 
The statute imposes civil monetary penalties on hospitals and 
physicians for violations and provides individuals harmed by a violation 
of the Act a private cause of action.152 
Indicative of its intended purpose to stop patient dumping, in one of 
the clearest sections of the statute, § 1395dd(h) expressly disallows any 
delay in either the required medical screening examination or 
stabilization “in order to inquire about the individual’s method of 
payment or insurance status.”153  Beyond this language though, the 
statute does not contain any mention of uninsured or indigent persons, 
patient dumping, economic discrimination, or insurance status—all the 
terms you would expect a statute with the specific purpose of stopping 
patient dumping to have.  Given how prevalent the problem of patient 
dumping was in the news154 and how clear the connection between 
EMTALA and patient dumping was in the minds of the legislators,155  
the legislators might not have imagined that EMTALA could be 
interpreted to mean anything other than to stop patient dumping.  
Perhaps the legislators thought that the prohibition in § 1395dd(h) was 
 
148.  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b). 
149.  Id. § 1395dd(c). 
150.  Id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B). 
151.  Id. § 1395dd(e)(4).  The statute defines “transfer” as  
the movement (including the discharge) of an individual outside a hospital’s 
facilities at the direction of any person employed by (or affiliated or associated, 
directly or indirectly, with) the hospital, but does not include such a movement of an 
individual who (A) has been declared dead, or (B) leaves the facility without the 
permission of any such person. 
Id. 
152.  Id. § 1395dd(d); see supra Part II.A.3. 
153.  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h). 
154.  See, e.g., Dudley Clendinen, Meeting on Poor and Health Care: Growing Number 
of Uninsured Putting a Financial Strain on University Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1985, at 
B13; Reinhold, supra note 128. 
155.  See supra notes 129–40 and accompanying text. 
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enough to stop the problem—possibly rationalizing that if the hospital 
could not ask about a patient’s ability to pay, then it could not 
discriminate against them on that basis.  Unfortunately, the lack of clear, 
overt language limiting EMTALA to genuine instances of patient 
dumping led the courts to interpret EMTALA in conflicting ways. 
IV. CLARIFYING THE STATUTE: 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF EMTALA 
A. District Courts Divided 
Even though (a) the Senators and Representatives were very clear 
when debating EMTALA that it was intended as a direct response to 
patient dumping,156 (b) the general public understood it to be an anti-
patient-dumping law after its enactment,157 and (c) various members of 
the U.S. government had the same understanding,158 the statute’s 
language is not so clear.159  Following EMTALA’s passage, the courts 
have struggled to clarify and interpret the requirements of the statute, 
especially the medical screening requirement.160 
In Nichols v. Estabrook,161 one of the earliest EMTALA cases, the 
parents of a deceased sixteen-week-old attempted to establish the ED 
physician’s liability based on a duty of care allegedly created by 
 
156.  See supra Part III.A. 
157.  See, e.g., Katherine Bishop, Hospital May Lose Funds Over Transfers of Poor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1987, at A17; John Gorman, Hospital Is Accused of ‘Dumping’ Patient, CHI. 
TRIB., Aug. 5, 1988, at D1; Martin Tolchin, U.S. Seeks to Require Treatment of All Hospital 
Emergency Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1988, at 1; Hospital Charged with Dumping Homeless 
Patient, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2006, at A29; Hospitals’ Handling of Uninsured Patients 
Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1988, at A25. 
158.  See Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal 
Year 2009 Rates, 73 Fed. Reg. 48,434, 48,654 (Aug. 19, 2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 489) 
(“The statutory provisions cited above are frequently referred to as the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), also known as the patient antidumping statute. . . .  
Congress incorporated these antidumping provisions . . . to ensure that individuals with 
emergency medical conditions are not denied essential lifesaving services.”); Tolchin, supra 
note 157 (“‘Clearly our objectives are to prevent patient dumping, and to stop it when it does 
occur,’ three officials of the Department of Health and Human Services said in a letter to 
hospital administrators accompanying the proposed new regulations . . . .”). 
159.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012); Lee, supra note 81, at 153. 
160.  Cohen, supra note 147, at 659–60 (“In the twenty years since EMTALA’s 
enactment, the screening requirement has engendered more confusion than any other 
EMTALA provision.”). 
161.  741 F. Supp. 325 (D.N.H. 1989). 
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EMTALA.162  In that case, the parents brought their baby into the ED 
complaining of flu symptoms.163  The ED physician examined the baby, 
ordered and interpreted blood tests, contacted the family’s pediatrician, 
and recommended that the parents take the baby to a nearby hospital 
where the pediatrician would be waiting for them.164  When the parents 
requested an ambulance, the ED physician responded that the 
ambulance would only be used in an emergency, their situation was not 
an emergency, and the baby would be fine.165  When the parents arrived 
at the other hospital fifteen minutes later the baby showed diminished 
vital signs and eventually died forty-five minutes later.166  The court 
interpreted the legislative history of EMTALA and held that the 
parents failed to state a cause of action under EMTALA because they 
did “not allege that their financial condition or lack of health insurance 
contributed to Dr. Estabrook’s decision not to treat their son.”167  The 
district court reasoned that Congress intended EMTALA “to provide 
some assurance that patients with emergency medical conditions will be 
examined and treated regardless of their financial resources,” and 
because the interest Congress sought to protect with the Act was not 
violated there could be no cause of action.168 
The groundwork having been laid in Nichols for limiting EMTALA 
to cases of genuine patient dumping,169 the courts began to build on the 
Nichols court’s reasoning.  In Evitt v. University Heights Hospital,170 the 
court granted summary judgment for the hospital because the plaintiff 
was “unable to present evidence which could prove that she was turned 
away from the Hospital for economic reasons, in violation of 
[EMTALA].”171  In that case, the plaintiff arrived at the ED 
complaining of chest pains.172  A doctor examined her, determined that 
she did not have an emergency medical condition, and discharged her to 
 
162.  Id. at 326, 329. 
163.  Id. at 326. 
164.  Id. 
165.  Id. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. at 330. 
168.  Id. 
169.  See id. 
170.  727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989). 
171.  Id. at 498. 
172.  Id. at 496. 
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her home.173  The plaintiff returned to the ED later that day and was 
admitted to critical care for a recent heart attack.174  The plaintiff argued 
that the hospital violated the appropriate medical screening requirement 
of EMTALA when the doctor failed to use a “12-lead EKG test” when 
examining her.175  The district court disagreed with the plaintiff’s 
argument because it “reache[d] beyond the purpose of the statute, 
which is specifically directed toward preventing prospective patients 
from being turned away for economic reasons.”176  The court went on to 
state that the plaintiff’s argument focused on the doctor’s initial 
diagnosis “rather than focusing on the ‘dumping’ problem.”177  The court 
clarified that “[c]laims regarding diagnosis and treatment lie in the area 
of medical malpractice, an area traditionally regulated by state law.  To 
adjudicate these issues under the anti-dumping provision would lead to 
federal preemption not contemplated under this Act.”178  The court 
reasoned, 
Taking the plaintiff’s argument to its logical conclusion would 
lead to the result that any patient dissatisfied with an emergency 
room diagnosis and release could sue the hospital under the anti-
dumping provision.  This construction would, in effect, make the 
Hospital the guarantor of the physicians’ diagnosis and treatment 
irrespective of how reasonable such diagnosis may have 
appeared at the time of the patient’s release, and irrespective of 
whether the patient was released for lack of funds or similar 
ulterior motive, on the one hand, or whether she was released 
simply because the physician after a reasonable examination saw 
no reason to commit her for hospitalization.  We do not believe 
that the federal statute goes so far.179 
By limiting EMTALA’s application to instances of economic 
discrimination in accordance with the statute’s purpose, the Evitt court 
avoided improperly making EMTALA a federal malpractice statute.  
The required showing of economic discrimination helps to draw the line 
 
173.  Id. 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. at 497. 
176.  Id. (citing Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Med. Hosp., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 853, 853 
(S.D. Ind. 1989)). 
177.  Id. 
178.  Id. 
179.  Id. at 497–98. 
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between an EMTALA violation and medical malpractice, without which 
the line between the two becomes very blurry.180 
The Evitt court’s fear of EMTALA becoming confused with 
standard medical malpractice claims was shared by the court in Stewart 
v. Myrick.181  In Stewart the court granted summary judgment to the 
hospital in a wrongful death action because the case was not an act of 
patient dumping, which would require the plaintiff to have been refused 
“medical care for economic reasons.”182  In that case the decedent had 
gone to the ED twice prior to his death.183  There were some genuine 
issues of fact as to the diagnosis and treatment of the decedent; 
however, it was undisputed that the decedent was neither discharged 
nor denied care due to economic reasons.184  The court reasoned that the 
plaintiff’s case was a standard medical malpractice claim that did “not 
present the type of evil that Congress sought to eliminate in the Act,” 
and therefore the claim was dismissed.185 
After Nichols, Evitt, and Stewart, it seemed that the district courts 
were in agreement that EMTALA’s legislative history clearly showed 
that EMTALA was intended to stop genuine instances of patient 
dumping, and applying the statute without a showing of economic 
discrimination would come too close to crossing into the prohibited 
realm of medical malpractice.  This approach to interpreting EMTALA 
took a different direction with Deberry v. Sherman Hospital Ass’n.186 
In Deberry the court changed the course of judicial interpretation in 
EMTALA litigation by denying the defendant hospital’s summary 
judgment motion even though the plaintiff did not allege that the 
hospital failed to stabilize her daughter for economic reasons.187  In this 
 
180.  See generally Cohen, supra note 147 (examining EMTALA’s screening 
requirement and suggesting ways to distinguish EMTALA screening violation claims from 
state medical malpractice claims); Lee, supra note 81, at 168 (noting the common complaint 
that the plaintiffs’ bar use EMTALA to remove state medical malpractice claims to federal 
court); Larson, supra note 126, at 1457–58 (discussing the confusion between medical 
malpractice claims and EMTALA claims, and arguing for the courts to require a showing of 
economic discrimination for EMTALA claims in order to avoid this confusion). 
181.  See Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 436 (D. Kan. 1990); Evitt, 727 F. Supp. at 
497–98. 
182.  Stewart, 731 F. Supp. at 436. 
183.  Id. at 434. 
184.  Id. 
185.  Id. at 436. 
186.  741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
187.  Id. at 1305–07 (“Sherman argues that, in order to state a cause of action under 
§ 1395dd, a plaintiff must allege facts which support the conclusion that he was “dumped” . . . 
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case the plaintiff’s daughter was brought into the ED with multiple 
symptoms, was treated, and then discharged.188  Two days later the 
daughter was admitted to the hospital with spinal meningitis.189  The 
plaintiff alleged that the hospital violated the stabilization prong of 
EMTALA.190  Relying on Evitt and Stewart, the hospital brought a 
summary judgment motion for failure to state a claim because this was 
not a case of patient dumping.191  The court agreed that Congress 
enacted EMTALA “to alleviate the problem of ‘patient dumping’”; 
however, unlike the courts in Evitt and Stewart, the Deberry court 
declined “to depart from the plain meaning of the statute as enacted.”192  
In applying EMTALA the court reasoned that the Act “nowhere 
mentions either indigency, an inability to pay, or the hospital’s motive as 
a prerequisite to statutory coverage,” therefore, the Act is not limited to 
instances of patient dumping even though the legislative history 
indicates otherwise.193  The court stated that the plain meaning of 
statutory language must be followed, and if one of the statute’s terms is 
ambiguous, then legislative history may be used to help interpret the 
term.194  The court held that a failure to stabilize claim under EMTALA 
did not require the showing of an economic motive.195  Subsequent 
courts found the Deberry court’s reasoning to be persuasive and 
declined to require a showing of economic discrimination in EMTALA 
claims;196 however, the Sixth Circuit applies the Deberry court’s 
reasoning in a unique fashion. 
 
from a hospital emergency room based upon his inability to pay. . . .  Plaintiff Deberry has 
alleged no such facts and has in fact admitted to her daughter’s having received at least some 
treatment. . . . [¶]  For the foregoing reasons, Sherman’s motion to dismiss Count I is 
denied.”). 
188.  Id. at 1303. 
189.  Id. 
190.  Id. 
191.  Id. at 1303, 1305–06. 
192.  Id. at 1304, 1306. 
193.  Id. at 1306. 
194.  Id.  
195.  See id. at 1306–07. 
196.  See, e.g., Brodersen v. Sioux Valley Mem’l Hosp., 902 F. Supp. 931, 947 (N.D. Iowa 
1995) (relying on the reasoning in Deberry). 
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B. The Sixth Circuit’s Approach: An Improper Motive Requirement 
In Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc.,197 the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint on different 
grounds,198 and in so doing distinguished itself amongst the federal 
appellate courts.  In Cleland the plaintiff’s fifteen-year-old son was 
examined by a physician in the defendant’s ED, diagnosed with 
influenza, and discharged in the early morning.199  Sadly, the diagnosis 
was incorrect, and the son returned to the hospital later that night, 
suffering from a heart attack, and died.200  The plaintiff brought suit for 
violations of both the appropriate medical screening and stabilization 
prongs of EMTALA.201 
The Sixth Circuit declined to follow the reasoning of the district 
court, which relied upon the legislative history of EMTALA to limit 
EMTALA claims to indigent or uninsured patients.202  Instead the Sixth 
Circuit followed the reasoning of the Deberry court, which relied upon 
the text of EMTALA to allow claims by patients not alleging that ability 
to pay was the reason they were denied treatment.203  In discussing 
canons of construction, the Sixth Circuit recognized that the plain 
meaning interpretation of the words in EMTALA “leads to a result 
considerably broader than one might think Congress should have 
intended, or perhaps than any or all individual members of Congress 
were cognizant of.”204  The court explicitly declined to correct the statute 
through its ability to interpret the statute and stated that it was up to 
Congress to correct its mistake.205  Accordingly, the court reasoned that 
the plain words of EMTALA made clear that “[t]he benefits and rights 
of the statutes extend ‘to any individual’ who arrives at the hospital.”206 
 
197.  917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990). 
198.  Id. at 268 (“The district court . . . dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based on its interpretation that the Act applied only to 
indigent and uninsured patients.  We affirm the district court, though on different grounds.”). 
199.  Id. at 268. 
200.  Id. 
201.  Id. at 269.  These alleged EMTALA violations were in addition to the plaintiffs’ 
state medical malpractice action.  Id. at 268. 
202.  Id. 
203.  Id. at 270. 
204.  Id. 
205.  See id. at 270 (“[I]t is not our place to rewrite statutes to conform with our notions 
of efficacy or rationality.  That is the job of Congress.”). 
206.  Id. at 269. 
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Although the Sixth Circuit held that the plain words of a statute 
were controlling, the court also held that legislative history could be 
used to interpret ambiguous phrases, such as appropriate medical 
screening.207  Considering the circumstances in which EMTALA was 
enacted and the legislature’s intent to stop patient dumping, the court 
reasoned “‘appropriate’ can be taken to mean care similar to care that 
would have been provided to any other patient.”208  The court further 
reasoned that “appropriate” must refer to the hospital’s motives.209  This 
interpretation of ‘appropriate’ screening is commonly referred to as the 
Sixth Circuit’s improper motive requirement. 
The Sixth Circuit provided further clarification of its improper 
motive requirement.  The Sixth Circuit’s test of whether or not a 
hospital violated its obligation of providing an appropriate medical 
screening under EMTALA is a two part test.  First, the court must 
determine whether the hospital “act[ed] in the same manner as it would 
have for the usual paying patient,” if so, then the screening was 
appropriate and the court does not consider the second part of the 
test.210  If the hospital provides a disparate screening, then the court 
must apply the second part of the test: the court must determine 
whether the hospital provided a disparate screening because of the 
patient’s sex, race, ethnic group, occupation, politics, personal prejudice, 
condition (e.g., drunkenness, AIDS), or inability to pay,211 and if so, the 
hospital is in violation of the medical screening prong of EMTALA.212 
 
207.  Id. at 271 (“Congress did limit the cause of action provided by the Act to only 
those who did not receive an ‘appropriate’ screening . . . .  In attempting to interpret [this] 
ambiguous phrase[], we can look to legislative history, along with other aids to 
construction.”).  The court referred to ‘appropriate’ as “one of the most wonderful weasel 
words in the dictionary.”  Id. 
208.  Id. 
209.  Id. at 272 (“[T]he terms of [EMTALA], specifically referring to a medical 
screening exam by a hospital ‘within its capabilities’ precludes resort to a malpractice or other 
objective standard of care as the meaning of the term ‘appropriate.’ Instead, ‘appropriate’ 
must more correctly be interpreted to refer to the motives with which the hospital acts.”) 
210.  See id. 
211.  See id.  This is not an exhaustive list of reasons that can be considered an improper 
motive for providing a less than standard screening or denying a medical screening entirely.  
See id. 
212.  See id.  Some courts have applied the disparate screening portion from the first 
part of the Sixth Circuit’s improper motive requirement, but instead of applying the second 
part of the test by determining the hospital’s motive behind the disparate screening, they 
merely determine whether or not the screening comported to the hospital’s standard 
screening procedures.  Kim C. Stanger, Private Lawsuits Under EMTALA, HEALTH LAW., 
June 2000, 27, at 29 (2000). 
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Applying this improper motive requirement in Cleland, the Sixth 
Circuit held “that the complaint simply fail[ed] to allege any 
inappropriateness in the medical screening in the sense required by 
[EMTALA].”213  The court reasoned that the outcome would not have 
been different for a patient with different characteristics.214  In other 
words, the plaintiffs did not allege any facts that the screening given to 
their son would have been different if he had a different financial status 
(or race, occupation, etc.); therefore, there was no violation of 
EMTALA’s screening prong.  In a later case, the Sixth Circuit applied 
its improper motive requirement to the stabilization prong of EMTALA 
and this led to the first and only Supreme Court decision interpreting 
EMTALA. 
C. The Supreme Court Interprets EMTALA 
A little over a decade after EMTALA’s enactment, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to its first EMTALA case, Roberts v. Galen of 
Virginia, Inc.215  In Roberts the Court, in a rather brief opinion, reversed 
the Sixth Circuit’s decision affirming the district court’s summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant hospital.216  The Sixth Circuit, in its 
holding, had applied the improper motive requirement articulated in 
Cleland to the stabilization prong of EMTALA.217  In reversing the 
Sixth Circuit, the Court reasoned that the word appropriate was not 
included in § 1395dd(b) of EMTALA—the stabilization prong—and 
therefore claims brought under that section did not require the showing 
of an improper motive.218 
The Court limited its opinion to only EMTALA’s stabilization prong 
by “hold[ing] that § 1395dd(b) contains no express or implied ‘improper 
motive’ requirement.”219  The Court was explicitly clear that it was not 
considering whether a showing of an improper motive was required for 
 
213.  Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271. 
214.  Id. 
215.  525 U.S. 249 (1999) (per curiam). 
216.  Id. at 254. 
217.  Id. at 252 (“The Court of Appeals’ holding—that proof of improper motive was 
necessary for recovery under § 1395dd(b)’s stabilization requirement—extended earlier 
Circuit precedent deciding that the ‘appropriate medical screening’ duty under § 1395dd(a) 
also required proof of an improper motive.”). 
218.  Id. at 253 (“But there is no question that the text of § 1395dd(b) does not require 
an ‘appropriate’ stabilization, nor can it reasonably be read to require an improper motive.”). 
219.  Id. 
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claims under the medical screening prong of EMTALA when it stated in 
dicta, “[t]he question of the correctness of the Cleland court’s reading of 
§ 1395dd(a)’s ‘appropriate medical screening’ requirement is not before 
us, and we express no opinion on it here.”220  In light of the only 
Supreme Court decision to date pertaining to EMTALA,221 the Sixth 
Circuit’s improper motive requirement remains good law as to 
EMTALA’s appropriate medical screening requirement.  The fact that 
the Sixth Circuit’s attempt to bring its decisions more in line with the 
legislative history of EMTALA remains good law gives hope to the idea 
that other solutions can be found to further resolve the inconsistencies 
between the Act’s intended purpose and its practical effects. 
V. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS FOR THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
OF EMTALA 
A. Congress Should Amend EMTALA 
One way to resolve the inconsistencies between the Legislature’s 
intended purpose for EMTALA and the Act’s text is for Congress to 
correct its mistake and amend EMTALA.222  This Comment suggests a 
series of amendments to EMTALA that will bring the Act into 
conformity with its legislative history and simultaneously alleviate some 
of the burden the Act places on EDs. 
Congress should amend EMTALA in order to limit the Act’s 
requirements to those individuals who the Legislature intended to 
protect when it promulgated the Act.  To amend EMTALA in the most 
efficient way possible and simultaneously clarify ambiguous text, 
§ 1395dd(e) should be amended to read as follows (suggested changes in 
italics): 
(e) Definitions 
In this section: 
(1) The term “individual” means a person who is either 
indigent or uninsured.223 
 
220.  Id. 
221.  As of the time of this Comment’s publication, Roberts is the only Supreme Court 
decision pertaining to EMTALA. 
222.  See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text. 
223.  Other commentators have suggested using indigent and uninsured individual rather 
than indigent or uninsured individual in proposing an amendment to EMTALA.  See Smith, 
supra note 11, at 1534 n.196.  This Comment however, suggests using an inclusive or rather 
than using a conjunction such as and so that the amended version of EMTALA will be 
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(2)224 The term “emergency medical condition” means— 
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute 
symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe 
pain) such that the absence of immediate medical 
attention could reasonably be expected to result in— 
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with 
respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the 
woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy, 
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or 
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or 
part; or 
(B) with respect to a pregnant woman who is having 
contractions— 
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe 
transfer to another hospital before delivery, or 
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health 
or safety of the woman or the unborn child. 
(3) The term “participating hospital” means a hospital 
that has entered into a provider agreement under section 
1395cc of this title. 
(4) The term “appropriate medical screening” means a 
screening consistent with the hospital’s standard procedure 
provided to patients with the ability to pay for their 
emergency medical care. 
(5) (A) The term “to stabilize” means, with respect to an 
emergency medical condition described in paragraph 
(2)(A), to provide such medical treatment of the 
 
consistent with the Act’s legislative history as much as possible.  Members of both the House 
and Senate spoke in terms of both insurance and indigent status when referring to the ills that 
EMTALA was meant to address.  See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 28,568 (1985) (statement of Sen. 
Durenberger) (“[The] practice of rejecting indigent patients in life threatening situations for 
economic reasons alone is unconscionable. . . .  Congress and the State legislatures are 
groping for areas to get quality health care to the uninsured Americans.”); H.R. REP. NO. 99-
241, pt. 3, at 5 (1985) (“In recent years there has been a growing concern about the provision 
of adequate emergency room medical services to individuals who seek care, particularly as to 
the indigent and uninsured.”).  Using an inclusive or in indigent or uninsured ensures that 
persons of either status are protected under EMTALA, as the Legislature intended, whereas 
using indigent and uninsured might be interpreted to exclude individuals not meeting both 
criteria.  The essence of patient dumping is the hospital’s motivation not to be stuck with the 
cost of care for those individuals it perceives will be unable to pay; therefore, it is most 
appropriate for EMTALA to protect those individuals most likely to be affected by the 
hospital’s motivation—indigent individuals and uninsured individuals.   
224.  This Comment suggests amending EMTALA to include two additional definitions; 
therefore, the enumeration of this statutory section must be altered as reflected here. 
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condition as may be necessary to assure, within 
reasonable medical probability, that no material 
deterioration of the condition is likely to result from 
or occur during the transfer of the individual from a 
facility, or, with respect to an emergency medical 
condition described in paragraph (2)(B), to deliver 
(including the placenta). 
(B) The term “stabilized” means, with respect to an 
emergency medical condition described in paragraph 
(2)(A), that no material deterioration of the condition 
is likely, within reasonable medical probability, to 
result from or occur during the transfer of the 
individual from a facility, or, with respect to an 
emergency medical condition described in paragraph 
(2)(B), that the woman has delivered (including the 
placenta). 
(6) The term “transfer” means the movement (including 
the discharge) of an individual outside a hospital’s 
facilities at the direction of any person employed by (or 
affiliated or associated, directly or indirectly, with) the 
hospital, but does not include such a movement of an 
individual who (A) has been declared dead, or (B) leaves 
the facility without the permission of any such person. 
(7) The term “hospital” includes a critical access hospital 
(as defined in section 1395x(mm)(1) of this title).225 
Other commentators have suggested that EMTALA’s 
nondiscrimination section should be amended “to explicitly state that 
the Act is intended only to redress economic discrimination.”226 One 
suggestion that is in harmony with the other solutions offered by this 
Comment, and therefore should be adopted, suggests amending 
§ 1395dd(g) to read as follows: 
(g) Nondiscrimination. 
(1) Intent. 
This Act is intended to redress only economic 
discrimination against individuals with emergency medical 
conditions by participating hospitals.  Any noneconomic 
discrimination against individuals with emergency medical 
 
225.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e) (2012).  Italics are only used to denote the changes to the 
statutory text resulting from this Comment’s suggested amendments. 
226.  Smith, supra note 11, at 1537. 
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conditions is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964; The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 701; The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
12101; and the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, 42 
U.S.C. § 5101. 
(2) Acceptance of appropriate transfers. 
A participating hospital that has specialized capabilities 
or facilities (such as burn units, shock-trauma units, 
neonatal intensive care units, or (with respect to rural 
areas) regional referral centers as identified by the 
Secretary in regulation) shall not refuse to accept an 
appropriate transfer of an indigent and uninsured 
individual who requires such specialized capabilities or 
facilities if the hospital has the capacity to treat the 
individual.227 
These suggested amendments more accurately express the intention 
of the Legislature when it promulgated EMTALA than the current 
language of the statute.  As the courts have noted, the current language 
of the statute “leads to . . . result[s] considerably broader than one might 
think Congress should have intended, or perhaps than any or all 
individual members of Congress were cognizant of.”228 These 
amendments fix Congress’s mistake by limiting EMTALA to actual 
instances of patient dumping. 
Defining individual in the proposed manner229 limits EMTALA’s 
protection to indigent or uninsured persons—those persons the 
Legislature intended to protect with the Act.230  Defining individual 
resolves any confusion as to EMTALA’s proper application by 
providing plain language for the courts to follow.231  To state a cause of 
action under the amended statute, a plaintiff must prove that she was 
 
227.  Id.  This note’s proposed language for an amended nondiscrimination section of 
EMTALA is well written and combines with this Comment’s other proposed amendments to 
clearly state that EMTALA only applies to situations of economic discrimination by hospitals 
towards indigent or uninsured persons. 
228.  Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 270 (6th Cir. 1990). 
229.  See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
230.  See supra Part III.A. 
231.  See Smith, supra note 11, at 1534 (“The confusion over EMTALA’s application 
centers around the Act’s application to ‘any individual.’”).  Adding a definition for 
“individual” is an efficient way to clarify who EMTALA applies to, although the same end 
could be achieved by several amendments adding “indigent or uninsured” before each 
instance of “individual” throughout the Act.  See id. at 1534–36 (proposing amendments to 
EMTALA adding “indigent and uninsured” before occurrences of “individual.”). 
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either indigent or uninsured when she arrived at the ED, which does not 
seem to be an overly burdensome task.    
While defining individual clarifies who EMTALA covers, defining 
appropriate medical screening clarifies what actions EMTALA requires.  
The amendment formally adopts the disparate screening definition from 
the first part of the Sixth Circuit’s improper motive requirement that 
many courts already apply.232  Under the amended statute, a plaintiff 
would need to prove that the hospital did not follow the same screening 
procedures in the ED when screening her as the hospital follows when 
screening an insured patient. 
An additional benefit to defining appropriate medical screening with 
plain language text is that the ambiguity of the phrase is removed.  The 
clarity provided by the definition should resolve the split between the 
federal appellate courts and subsequently lead to greater consistency in 
judicial decisions.  Furthermore, the removal of this ambiguity will assist 
hospitals in developing better practices.  Hospitals wishing to comply 
with EMTALA will now know that they need to develop standard 
procedures for screening patients in the ED and follow those procedures 
with every patient, or else have a nondiscriminatory reason for deviating 
from the procedure.233 
While defining appropriate medical screening clarifies what actions 
EMTALA requires, the amendment to § 1395dd(g) clarifies what 
motives the hospital must have if disparate treatment is given.  As 
discussed previously, the Legislature clearly intended for EMTALA to 
prohibit EDs from refusing emergency medical care to indigent or 
uninsured persons because of the patient’s inability to pay for the 
care.234  The amended nondiscrimination section limits EMTALA 
 
232.  See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
233.  This does not mean that hospitals should engage in patient dumping and have a 
prepared noneconomic reason for providing disparate treatment; rather, this is merely an 
attempt to account for situations where a deviation from standard procedures is both 
necessary and proper.  An example of such a situation would be when a patient arrives at a 
small, rural ED with a broken leg and a medical screening begins in accordance with standard 
procedures, but before the examination is complete, a gunshot victim arrives and the medical 
care provider deviates from the standard procedure by stepping away from the patient with 
the broken leg to assist with the gunshot victim.  It would behoove those persons in charge of 
developing a hospital’s standard procedures to incorporate situations such as this hypothetical 
situation into their formal standard procedures; however, every situation is not foreseeable, 
and some procedure developers might overlook certain situations.  Those hospitals 
attempting in good faith to comply with EMTALA should not be penalized for their lack of 
foresight. 
234.  See supra Part III.A. 
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protection to the economic discrimination that the legislators found 
abhorrent.235  The courts agree in dicta to this understanding of the 
legislative history but disagree over the role legislative history plays in 
applying the statute.236  This amendment resolves the disagreement by 
putting in plain language the intent of the Legislature and inserting it 
into the statute for the courts to apply.  This amendment also 
incorporates the second part of the Sixth Circuit’s improper motive 
requirement into the statute.237  Under the amended statute, a plaintiff 
would need to prove that the hospital provided a disparate medical 
screening because the hospital believed that the plaintiff would be 
unable to pay for her care.238 
Adopting these amendments will also help to reduce some of the 
fiscal troubles hospitals with EDs currently face.  By limiting EMTALA 
so that it only applies to indigent or uninsured persons, only those 
persons are granted a private cause of action under § 1395dd(d)(2) for 
injuries resulting from an EMTALA violation.  The amendments reduce 
the pool of potential plaintiffs without granting the private cause of 
action to anyone not currently afforded that right.  Additionally, the 
amendments require the plaintiff to prove three elements not currently 
required by the statute’s language,239 which suggests fewer plaintiffs will 
bring claims because of an inability to prove the new elements.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that adopting the proposed 
amendments will not increase the number of plaintiffs bringing claims 
under EMTALA.  Hospitals will be able to save the money they are 
 
235.  See supra Part III.A. 
236.  See supra Part IV.A. 
237.  Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271–72 (6th Cir. 1990). 
238.  Requiring plaintiffs to prove a hospital’s motives or beliefs may be unduly 
burdensome, in which case Congress may wish to consider creating a rebuttable presumption 
of improper motive.  See generally Cohen, supra note 147, at 680–88 (proposing the adoption 
of a three part disparate screening test which incorporates a rebuttable presumption of an 
improper motive); Stricker, supra note 12, at 1151–56 (outlining how a rebuttable 
presumption of improper motive might work). 
239.  Plaintiffs must prove (1) they are either indigent or uninsured, (2) the hospital 
either failed to provide any medical screening or the exam it did provide was not in 
accordance with the standard procedures the hospital follows when providing medical 
screening exams to insured patients, and (3) the reason the hospital provided a disparate 
screening was because it believed that the plaintiff was unable to pay for the care.  It could be 
argued that plaintiffs currently have to prove element two because many courts use a 
disparate screening test to determine if a medical screening is an appropriate medical 
screening.  See supra note 212.  Even if element two is considered to be an element currently 
required to be proven, the other two new elements still add to the plaintiff’s burden of proof. 
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currently spending on defending claims240 brought by persons who are 
neither indigent nor uninsured.  Since there will be fewer claims brought 
against hospitals, it is reasonable to believe that there will be fewer 
judgments against hospitals as well.  Fewer judgments against hospitals 
mean more savings. 
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that hospitals spend billions of dollars in 
defending EMTALA claims each year; therefore, the cost savings from 
the proposed amendments alone will not balance out the billions of 
dollars in uncompensated care costs EMTALA creates.  However, these 
savings might slow the rate of hospital and ED closures, which in turn 
could slow the rate of ED overcrowding.  The money saved may allow 
hospitals that are closer to solvency (−1% or −2% profit margins) to 
remain open.  Obviously, these savings will not have the same effect on 
hospitals facing −7% profit margins; thus, adoption of these 
amendments is not a complete solution to the fiscal problems burdening 
U.S. hospitals. 
Although the suggested amendments limit EMTALA’s application 
to indigent or uninsured persons, insured patients are not left without a 
remedy for denial of emergency medical care.  Insured patients likely 
have other legal recourses available to them, which, depending on the 
jurisdiction, may include a medical malpractice claim.241  Hospitals 
contract with private insurance companies and the government to 
provide services to patients covered under private or public insurance 
programs respectively.242  The contract between the hospital and insurer 
creates a duty of care between the hospital and the patients covered by 
the insurance provider.243  If a hospital fails to provide the services 
required under those contracts to covered persons, the hospital will be 
 
240.  These costs include money spent on preparing for litigation (e.g., attorney’s fees, 
expert witness fees), as well as the money spent for those claims that actually go to trial (e.g., 
attorney’s fees, court costs, additional expert witness fees).  The important point to 
understand is that hospitals lose some amount of money on every claim that is brought 
against them, regardless of whether the claim goes to trial.  
241.  See, e.g., Hand v. Tavera, 864 S.W.2d 678, 678, 680 (Tex. App. 1993) (allowing a 
medical malpractice claim against the prepaid health plan ED physician for denying him 
admission to the hospital). 
242.  See id. at 679–80. 
243.  See id. at 680 (holding that “when a patient who has enrolled in a prepaid medical 
plan goes to a hospital emergency room and the plan’s designated doctor is consulted, the 
physician–patient relationship exists and the doctor owes the patient a duty of care”); see also 
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 589 (7th ed. 
2013) (discussing contractually created physicians’ duty of care). 
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liable to the patient for breaching its contractually created duty of care.  
Additionally, it is to be expected that the care mandated by EMTALA 
will be used as a model for the most basic level of care negotiated for by 
private insurance companies.  This is to be expected because the 
amendments do not remove EMTALA from Medicare’s Conditions of 
Participation and the trend in American health care is for private 
insurance companies to adopt the standards set by the government.244 
B. Courts Should Adopt the Sixth Circuit’s Improper Motive 
Requirement 
If the previously suggested amendments are not adopted, at the very 
least the federal courts of appeals should adopt the Sixth Circuit’s 
improper motive requirement.  Adoption of the improper motive 
requirement is a way for the courts to bring their decisions closer in line 
with the purpose of EMTALA while adhering to the accepted canons of 
construction. 
As the Cleland court mentioned in dicta, it is likely that EMTALA is 
being applied in a broader manner than Congress intended because of 
the plain meaning of its text, but it is not for the courts to diverge from 
the plain meaning of statutory text.245  Adoption of the improper motive 
requirement preserves the text of EMTALA that has a plain meaning 
by continuing to apply EMTALA to all patients presenting at EDs 
requesting care.  However, where there is ambiguity in text, such as 
“appropriate medical screening,” courts have flexibility in interpreting 
that text.  When determining ambiguous text’s meaning, courts should 
consider the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the statute.246  This 
method—applying the text’s plain meaning when it exists and 
considering the Legislature’s intent when interpreting ambiguous 
statutory text—results in court decisions that do not overstep the court’s 
authority and applies the statute with the greatest level of conformity to 
how the Legislature intended the statute be applied. 
Another reason the improper motive requirement should be 
adopted by the courts is that the improper motive requirement limits 
plaintiffs to those more closely related to the category of patients 
originally intended to be protected by EMTALA.  The improper motive 
requirement does not limit plaintiffs to only those turned away from the 
 
244.  See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text. 
245.  Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 269–70 (6th Cir. 1990) 
246.  Id. at 269, 271. 
 1800 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1759 
ED for their inability to pay, but the reasoning behind the requirement 
is much the same: EDs should not discriminate in providing patients 
emergency services.  Adoption of the improper motive requirement 
preserves the level of care everyone is presently entitled to under 
EMTALA but will reduce the number of claims brought under the 
statute because the requirement weeds out improper claims. 
Weeding out improper claims is both beneficial to the judicial system 
and fiscally beneficial to hospitals with EDs.  Limiting EMTALA claims 
to proper plaintiffs is good for the judicial system because it results in a 
proper use of the law, which is a good unto itself.  Additionally, the 
elimination of claims by improper plaintiffs reduces the burden those 
cases would have placed on the already overworked federal court 
system. 
Limiting EMTALA claims to proper plaintiffs is good for hospitals 
with EDs because it will reduce the amount those hospitals spend on 
defending EMTALA claims.  As was previously mentioned, hospitals 
presumably do not spend billions of dollars in defending EMTALA 
claims each year;247 therefore, the cost savings from the reduction in 
EMTALA claims will not make up for the billions of dollars in 
uncompensated care costs EMTALA creates.  But much like the 
statutory amendments this Comment proposes, these savings created by 
reducing the amount of EMTALA litigation might slow the rate of 
hospital and ED closures, and thereby also slow the rate of ED 
overcrowding.  The hospitals that stand the greatest chance of 
benefitting from the reduction in litigation costs are those that are on 
the border of solvency and insolvency.  These savings should not be 
expected to have a significantly beneficial effect on hospitals facing −7% 
profit margins; thus, adoption of the Sixth Circuit’s improper motive 
requirement is not a complete solution to the fiscal problems facing 
America’s hospitals either.  In order for the financial burden that 
EMTALA places on EDs to be lifted, Congress will have to take direct 
action to fund the care provided under EMTALA. 
C. Congress Should Fund EMTALA 
The most direct way to solve the financial and quality of care 
problems created by EMTALA’s promulgation is to fund EMTALA.  
Other commentators have remarked that it is very unlikely that 
Congress will take any action that will increase the government’s share 
 
247.  See supra Part V.A. 
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of health care costs,248 and this is likely true; however, given the serious 
consequences of continuing to require EDs to provide uncompensated 
care to the uninsured, the idea of funding EMTALA should be given 
serious consideration.  This view was shared by the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Labor Act Technical Advisory Group, which gave high 
priority status to its recommendation “that HHS act to support 
amending the EMTALA statute to include a funding mechanism for 
hospitals and physicians.”249 
Reimbursing hospitals for the care they provide to uninsured people 
under EMTALA is the most direct way to stop patient dumping and 
thereby achieve the Legislature’s noble goal.  The decision to engage in 
patient dumping is a fiscally motivated decision.  If hospitals were 
compensated for the care that they are required by EMTALA to 
provide, then they would have no incentive to dump patients. 
Some commentators might argue that funding EMTALA would 
provide a perverse incentive for individuals to forego obtaining health 
insurance and remain uninsured, either because they will receive better 
health coverage or free, although limited, health coverage.  This is not 
the case because the minimal level of health coverage provided under 
EMTALA in combination with the fines imposed by the ACA’s 
individual mandate for not being insured250 provide a greater incentive 
to be insured than uninsured. 
If EMTALA was funded, the level of medical care provided to 
individuals in EDs would remain the same—an appropriate medical 
screening and stabilization—and therefore uninsured individuals would 
not gain additional hospital care by remaining uninsured.  Additionally, 
funding EMTALA would not open the doors of primary care 
physicians’ offices or other medical providers to the uninsured because 
EMTALA only applies to emergency medical care provided by EDs;251 
thus, non-ED medical care providers would have no new incentive to 
treat uninsured patients.  Therefore, funding EMTALA would not 
remove the present incentive for uninsured patients to obtain insurance, 
namely a greater level of health coverage. 
 
248.  See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 32, at 292 (“Congress is unlikely to enact any 
amendment to the ACA that increases its costs . . . .”). 
249.  EXTRACT OF FINAL REPORT OF THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND 
LABOR ACT TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP TO THE U.S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES 27, 29 (2008). 
250.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(c) (2012). 
251.  See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, if EMTALA were funded, the ACA’s individual 
mandate would still be in effect and through its fines continue to provide 
an incentive for people to obtain health insurance.252  If necessary, these 
fines could be increased to reduce any incentive funding EMTALA 
might create to remain uninsured.  Additionally, the funding mechanism 
could be purposefully structured to reduce any incentive it may create 
for persons to remain uninsured given a choice.253 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In 1986 Congress laudably enacted EMTALA to combat the 
lamentable rise in hospitals engaging in patient dumping, but this Act is 
Janus-faced.  On the one hand, EMTALA opened the doors of EDs to 
everyone and in so doing turned EDs into the health care safety net for 
the entire United States.  EDs became the one place that all insured, 
uninsured, documented, and undocumented people can receive a 
minimal level of health care in the United States.  On the other hand, 
Congress’s failure to provide a funding mechanism for the care that 
EMTALA requires EDs to provide and covering everyone under the 
statute, rather than limiting the statute to protect only the victims of 
patient dumping, has resulted in EMTALA unraveling the very safety 
net it creates. 
Under the current system, the more uninsured patients an individual 
ED treats, the more debt that ED takes on, which in turn increases the 
chances for that ED to close.  Once that ED closes, its patients, both 
insured and uninsured, seek treatment at the remaining EDs.  Those 
EDs in turn must find a way to absorb the additional uncompensated 
care costs resulting from complying with EMTALA.  Those hospitals 
that are already on the brink of insolvency due to the Medicaid and 
Medicare payment shortfalls will become insolvent when they try and 
absorb the influx of new uninsured and underinsured patients.  
Eventually those EDs, and possibly the entire hospital, will also close.  
And so the safety net continues to unravel. 
If nothing is done to change the health care system and alleviate 
 
252.  See Diamond, supra note 32, at 268–69. 
253.  This Comment does not attempt to provide a detailed analysis for how the 
suggested EMTALA funding mechanism might be structured.  This Comment merely posits 
that it is plausible that HHS could structure a funding mechanism to reimburse hospitals for 
care provided in accordance with EMTALA without creating too great of an incentive for 
individuals to be uninsured.  See generally Lee, supra note 81, at 169–70 (2004) (suggesting 
two ways to fund care for uninsured and underinsured patients). 
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some of the financial burden placed on EDs, it is only a matter of time 
before EDs are a thing of the past.  The statistics and studies clearly 
show the number of ED visits to be steadily rising and the number of 
EDs to be steadily decreasing.254  As more people use EDs for both 
emergent and non-emergent care, ED overcrowding is becoming more 
commonplace.  The increase in ED overcrowding diminishes the quality 
of care every patient receives in the ED. 
Emergency health care is too important to let the entire safety net 
unravel.  This Comment recognizes that amending a statute is not an 
easy feat, politically or bureaucratically; however, considering what is at 
stake—preserving the minimum level of health care for all Americans, 
both from an accessibility and quality perspective—Congress should 
seriously consider amending EMTALA as proposed by this Comment 
or in a manner to reach the same ends that this Comment seeks. 
This Comment directs a similar call to action towards the federal 
appellate courts.  This Comment does not encourage the courts to 
become activist courts, but it does encourage them to give serious 
thought to adopting good law—the Sixth Circuit’s improper motive 
requirement—in accordance with accepted canons of construction—
considering legislative history when interpreting ambiguous language in 
a statute.  The courts are not in a position to fix all of EMTALA’s 
unintended consequences; however, they are in a position to give 
Congress some extra time to act. 
TRISTAN DOLLINGER* 
 
254.  TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK, supra note 22, at 32. 
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